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Objectivity cannot be equated with mental blankness; rather, 
objectivity resides in recognizing your preferences and then subjecting 
them to especially harsh scrutiny—and also in a willingness to revise 
or abandon your theories when the tests fail (as they usually do). 
—Stephen Jay Gould1 
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Evolutionary Theory, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2002, at A1. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1953, philosopher Isaiah Berlin used the fox/hedgehog 
distinction to describe and explain the life and work of Leo Tolstoy.2  
The dichotomy, attributed to the Greek warrior/poet Archilochus, 
goes something like this:  “The fox knows many things, but the 
hedgehog knows one big thing.”3  Berlin described Tolstoy as a fox—
                                                          
 2. ISAIAH BERLIN, The Hedgehog and the Fox, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND:   
AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 436, 436 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux 1998). 
 3. Id.  Others translate the quote differently:  “[F]oxes ‘pursue many ends, often 
unrelated and even contradictory.’”  Jonathan L. Entin, Peter Junger:  Scholar and 
Stylist, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 319, 319 (2008).  Entin describes a discourse in which 
Professor Junger called himself a fox, in contrast to “the Great Hedgehog,” Richard 
Posner.  Id. at 323. 
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fascinated by a variety of people and things—who sought to be a 
hedgehog—consumed and motivated by a central, single vision.4 
More than fifty years later, in 2005, Philip Tetlock applied the same 
distinction5 to the cognitive approaches of political forecasters:  those 
with unwavering commitment to a single world-view (hedgehogs) as 
opposed to those with a more open-minded cognitive approach who 
tend to see alternative explanations and embrace ambiguity (foxes).6  
Tetlock concluded that the fox is typically the better political 
forecaster, although the hedgehog is commendable because she 
persists in a particular view.7 
In this Article, I borrow the distinction and apply it to expert 
witnesses at trial.  Whatever type of expert, whether scientific, 
nonscientific, academic, or experiential, according to Berlin’s 
dichotomy, the hedgehog tends toward a single, central view of the 
world; she approaches this view with unwavering commitment.8   
The fox sees the gray, tending toward self-doubt about her view and 
always considering alternative explanations.9  As Stephen Jay Gould 
emphasized, neither is “better” because both intellectual styles are 
valuable and necessary in the pursuit and development of ideas.10 
I apply the distinction to a narrow category of cases and to one 
particular expert witness, Evan Kohlmann, who has testified 
repeatedly for the government in criminal cases against alleged 
terrorists.11  I posit that Kohlmann is a hedgehog-type expert, 
                                                          
 4. BERLIN, supra note 2, at 436, 438. 
 5. Stephen Jay Gould also uses the distinction in his book about interactions 
between the sciences and humanities.  STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE HEDGEHOG, THE FOX, 
AND THE MAGISTER’S POX:  MENDING THE GAP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES  
5–6 (2003). 
 6. See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT:  HOW GOOD IS IT?  HOW 
CAN WE KNOW? 2 (2005) (discussing the benefits of experts with fox-like traits as 
opposed to those with more hedgehog-like traits). 
 7. Id. at 19–24.  Tetlock does not identify individual forecasters; rather, he uses 
events such as the fall of the Soviet Union, id. at 107–08, the 2000 presidential 
election, id. at 133–34, and the collapse of communist regimes in North Korea and 
Cuba, id. at 96–97, to illustrate how well the forecasters as a group on each side of 
the continuum fared in terms of accuracy. 
 8. BERLIN, supra note 2, at 436–37. 
 9. Id. 
 10. GOULD, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Aref, 285 F. App’x 784, 792 (2d Cir. 2008), cert denied, 
129 S. Ct. 173 (2009); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 305 (4th Cir. 2008), 
cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009); United States v. Paracha, 313 F. App’x 347, 351  
(2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Sadequee, No. 1:06-Cr-147-WSD, 2009 WL 3785566, 
at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 10, 2009); United States v. El-Hindi, No. 3:06 Cr 719, 2009 WL 
1373268, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 15, 2009); United States v. Kassir, No. S2 04 Cr 
356(JFK), 2009 WL 910767, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009); United States v. Abu-
Jihaad, 600 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (D. Conn. 2009); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 
F. Supp. 2d 53, 59 n.5 (D.D.C. 2008), motion to vacate denied, 646 F. Supp. 2d 79 
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motivated by unfaltering devotion to one big idea.  Presumably, this 
cognitive approach impacts not only Kohlmann’s conclusions but 
also his method of arriving at his conclusions.12  Yet, despite potential 
shortcomings in Kohlmann’s methodology stemming from this kind 
of cognitive process,13 courts have readily, eagerly, and with very little 
scrutiny admitted Kohlmann to testify as an expert witness in the 
cases described herein. 
This Article considers how the hedgehog-type expert14 fares in the 
framework established by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert I).15  Many commentators have criticized 
Daubert because, among other problems, the five typical Daubert 
factors are ill-suited for social science.16  This Article takes a different 
tack.  Using the hedgehog/fox distinction, this Article shows that, 
particularly in the social science arena, the expert most likely to 
appeal to a court using the Daubert factors may be the least likely to 
testify based on a reliable social science methodology.  Said 
differently, how an expert thinks is as important to determining the 
trustworthiness of that expert’s methodology as what that expert 
thinks. 
                                                          
(D.D.C. 2009); United States v. Amawi, 552 F. Supp. 2d 669, 671 (N.D. Ohio 2008); 
United States v. Sabir, No. S4 05 Cr 673(LAP), 2007 WL 1373184, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 
10, 2007); United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 4856865, at *1  
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2007). 
 12. See GOULD, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing hedgehogs’ method of thought); 
TETLOCK, supra note 6, at 2 (“What experts think matters far less than how they 
think.”). 
 13. I never establish that Kohlmann’s methodology is unreliable or that his 
conclusions are wrong, nor do I try to do so, as this is not my objective.  Rather,  
I contend that we have no way of knowing whether this type of testimony is reliable 
because of shortcomings with Daubert as a gatekeeping tool.  As illustrated in the 
Article, I do suspect Kohlmann’s methodology is skewed by his hedgehog-type 
thinking. 
 14. I focus in this Article on the hedgehog-type expert.  The fox-type expert 
presents issues as well, as foxes’ self-doubting, uncertain, prone-to-controversy 
thought process would, presumably (and as described in more detail below), make 
this expert unattractive to courts.  In the arena of scientific expertise, commentators 
have already described how courts “idealize” scientific testimony and thus tend to 
exclude experts who express doubt and uncertainty.  See DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. 
LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND:  THE IDEALIZATION OF SCIENCE IN LAW 2–4, 15 (2006) 
(explaining how the idealization of science can prevent judges and other legal 
commentators from critically assessing the limits of science).  Caudill and LaRue do 
not rely on the fox/hedgehog dichotomy (or on characteristics of the experts) but 
rather on courts’ reaction to scientific experts who express uncertainty.  Id. at 15. 
 15. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 16. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert:  Developing a 
Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert 
Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2294 (1994) (discussing the difficulty of applying 
Daubert to nonscientific testimony). 
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In Part I, I examine the Daubert/Rule 70217 evidentiary reliability 
standard and courts’ current practice and procedure, illustrating 
what methods courts presently use to test for reliability.  This Part 
highlights the general, widespread inconsistency in how courts apply 
Daubert with respect to two key aspects of Daubert gatekeeping:   
(1) what factors make up the test, and (2) the degree of rigor with 
which courts apply the factors.  This Part provides background for 
illustrating the peril of courts vetting a hedgehog-type expert’s 
methodology using Daubert.  As described herein, Daubert actually 
serves to flatter the hedgehog-type expert, making the expert 
especially attractive to courts. 
Part II describes the fox/hedgehog distinction as applied to the 
cognitive styles of experts and judges.  In this Part, I narrow the focus 
to a particular set of cases—criminal cases against alleged terrorists in 
which the government routinely proffers, and courts routinely admit, 
a hedgehog-type expert.  I attempt to use the distinction as a lens 
through which one may consider Daubert gatekeeping with a certain 
type of expert.  Generally, we think of Daubert’s effectiveness as it 
relates to a particular category of cases or types of expertise (scientific 
versus nonscientific or criminal versus civil).  In this analysis, the 
expert has a particular cognitive approach—a specific way of 
processing information.  The expert’s cognitive approach 
significantly impacts how a court should assess the expert’s 
methodology for reliability.  Ideally, it also calls for self-reflection on 
the part of judges, who themselves tend to process information in 
certain ways, and it calls for a different set of presumptions for courts 
to apply when evaluating expert witnesses.18 
The hedgehog/fox dichotomy is best thought of as a continuum in 
terms of cognitive approaches.  In other words, it is unfair to describe 
an expert as a complete hedgehog or a complete fox; rather some 
have more hedgehog- or fox-like characteristics.19  The fox-type 
expert, if studied using the same paradigm (holding this type of 
                                                          
 17. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (outlining various requirements that must be met before 
testimony by experts can be admitted). 
 18. How judges process information in their decision-making is not the essence 
of this Article.  Yet, how judges think also impacts the phenomenon (and remedies) 
described in this Article.  See generally Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial 
Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1998); Tobin Sparling, Through Different Lenses:  
Using Psychology to Assess Popular Criticism of the Judiciary from the Public’s Perspective,  
19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2010). 
 19. See TETLOCK, supra note 6, at 87 (“Berlin recognized that few fit the ideal-type 
template of fox or hedgehog.  Most of us are hybrids, awkward hedge-fox and fox-
hog amalgams.”). 
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cognitive process up against the Daubert framework) would probably 
reveal the same set of issues.  This highlights why effective judicial 
gatekeeping should include exploring the expert’s methodology, 
including, specifically, how the expert thought about the issues. 
Ultimately, in Part III, I propose a revamped and rejuvenated 
Daubert standard for testing social science and nonscientific 
testimony.  The changes are meant to remedy the problem of courts’ 
reluctance and/or inability (for varying reasons) to carefully review 
expert methodology.20  As part of this proposal, I recommend that 
courts, in exercising their gatekeeping function, add certain 
presumptions and eliminate some existing presumptions to better 
assess not just what an expert is thinking but how the expert arrived 
at a theory. 
Obviously, some may criticize the use of the hedgehog/fox 
distinction as clumsy and simplistic.  Actually, Isaiah Berlin agreed 
that “if pressed,” the dichotomy could become “artificial, scholastic 
and ultimately absurd.”21  Yet, he counseled that the dichotomy could 
also prove beneficial: 
But if it is not an aid to serious criticism, neither should it be 
rejected as being merely superficial or frivolous; like all distinctions 
which embody any degree of truth, it offers a point of view from 
which to look and compare, a starting-point for genuine 
investigation.22 
Here, the distinction is used as a novel way of examining Daubert 
gatekeeping; as Berlin suggests, it provides a valuable investigative 
tool for this task. 
I. THE BASIC TENETS OF TRIAL COURT GATEKEEPING  
UNDER DAUBERT 
The point of this Article is not that Daubert is flawed but rather that 
shortcomings in our federal gatekeeping scheme are exacerbated 
when parties proffer experts who possess certain traits, specifically 
particular cognitive approaches.  Essentially, the test becomes largely 
ineffective with the hedgehog-type expert because Daubert actually 
masks potential flaws in this type of expert’s methods.  As this Article 
explains, the “one-big-idea” type expert is especially appealing to 
                                                          
 20.  The proposed solutions would certainly apply with equal force to a scientific 
expert (who could also be a hedgehog).  The only difference is that with certain 
hard-science expertise, the methodology would involve testing and replicating a test, 
so the trustworthiness of the expert’s method would have some internal checks. 
 21. BERLIN, supra note 2, at 437. 
 22. Id. 
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courts.  However, the Daubert test is not effective at assessing the 
reliability of this expert’s methodology. 
In 1994, soon after the Supreme Court decided Daubert, Professor 
Edward Imwinkelried urged courts and commentators to proceed 
from the objective validation standards for scientific testimony in 
Daubert to “the development of objective validation standards for 
nonscientific opinion,”23 which, according to Imwinkelried, would be 
difficult but was “both vital and feasible.”24 
Yet, sixteen years after Daubert, neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Federal Rules Advisory Committee has crafted a reliability standard 
for expert opinions involving social or soft sciences, or wholly 
nonscientific testimony.  Such a standard is lacking even after the 
Court expressly included all expert testimony—not just scientific 
testimony—within the scope of courts’ gatekeeping role in Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael,25 and after the Federal Rules Advisory 
Committee amended Rule 702 to incorporate the Daubert and Kumho 
rulings.26  Courts still cling to the scientifically grounded Daubert 
factors, sometimes merely giving Daubert lip service, even when the 
expert is a historian, political scientist, sociologist, or anthropologist, 
for whose testimony the factors are ill-suited.27  Accordingly,  
as Imwinkelried foretold, Daubert gatekeeping for social science and 
nonscientific experts reflects courts’ “laissez-faire attitude toward the 
reliability of the propositions underlying nonscientific expert 
testimony.”28  The absence of suitable factors for ensuring reliability 
                                                          
 23. Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2294. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (making no distinction for purposes of the 
courts’ gatekeeping obligation “between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or 
‘other specialized’ knowledge”). 
 26. The Court decided a third case, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 
(1997), which became part of the Daubert trilogy. 
 27. By nonscientific experts, I mean experts whose field does not involve the 
hard or soft sciences.  These experts are formally educated or trained and are 
working or teaching in fields such as history, sociology, anthropology, music, law, 
and linguistics.  See, e.g., Wayne v. Shadowen, 15 F. App’x 271, 285 n.24 (6th Cir. 
2001) (considering an expert affidavit by a music teacher); Cook v. Rockwell Int’l 
Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1165–66 (D. Colo. 2006) (discussing a historian’s expert 
report).  Obviously, the expertise of certain types of nonscientific experts, like 
accountants and bankers, is more “technical” and is thus subject to more objective 
verification or validation than other expertise.  See, e.g., United States v. Hermanek, 
289 F.3d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the Daubert factors to an investigator 
testifying on the coded meanings of words in the narcotics trade); Okerlund v. 
United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 341, 346 (2002) (applying the Daubert factors to an expert 
on valuation, whose qualifications were in business economics and finance). 
 28. Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2280–81. 
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of nonscientific expert opinions results in no real judicial 
gatekeeping at all.29 
Now, sixteen years after Imwinkelried suggested that the Court 
design a standard for social science and nonscientific testimony, 
courts’ gatekeeping with respect to evidentiary reliability of 
nonscientific testimony is haphazard in every respect.  Certain federal 
courts disregard the reliability requirement altogether (and focus 
almost exclusively on qualifications) and other federal courts assess 
reliability, but do so without a uniform standard or consistent degree 
of rigor.  Courts speak in Daubert language, yet their reliability 
assessments do not track Daubert factors (which is understandable, 
given that the factors are not well-suited to the task).  The result is 
that courts employ a cursory assessment rather than an “exacting 
analysis.”30  Accordingly (and ironically), the courts’ review is often 
most sketchy with nonscientific expertise, presumably because the 
methodology is not scientific and is thus not subject to objective 
validation, even though common sense would dictate stricter scrutiny 
because of the absence of a known objectively verifiable 
methodology.31 
Given the absence of a suitable gatekeeping test, the hedgehog-
type expert, whose one big idea informs all her related ideas, and 
who possesses strong qualifications stemming from her dogged 
pursuit of this one big idea, tends to easily pass Daubert muster.   
As shown below, evidence of the expert’s commitment to an idea 
becomes confused with evidence of the expert’s careful and 
methodical pursuit of the idea, which typically gets overlooked.  As a 
result, courts routinely admit this type of expert. 
The problem of testing the reliability of expert testimony under 
Daubert becomes even more pronounced when an expert relies 
heavily on sources that are difficult to authenticate, such as Internet 
sources.  Under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert 
                                                          
 29. Commentators argue that the courts’ misuse of Daubert supports the notion 
that juries, rather than judges, should make reliability determinations.  In other 
words, if courts are just going to pay lip service to the test, why not allow the jury to 
weigh the testimony instead of going through the motions of gatekeeping?  See Note, 
Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2142 (2003) (“[T]o the 
extent that judges do not follow a reliable methodology in executing their 
gatekeeping function, there is little guarantee that they will reach results superior to 
those of a jury and little reason to accept the trustworthiness of their rulings.”). 
 30. See McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 
2002) (“Rulings on admissibility under Daubert inherently require the trial court to 
conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered expert’s methodology.”). 
 31. Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2279 (“The very nature of scientific evidence 
builds in some assurance of the accuracy of the testimony.”). 
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can rely on inadmissible sources—such as websites and blogs—if the 
sources are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions.”32  For example, the “particular 
field” relied on by the expert described in this Article—the very 
current field of international terrorism since 9/11—requires 
substantial reliance on Internet sources.33  Consequently, screening 
the testimony of these experts for reliability is critical but is made 
more difficult as a result of the absence of suitable Daubert factors. 
This Part describes the Daubert standard, illustrating various 
problems with courts’ current application of the gatekeeping test.  
Section I.A addresses the standard itself, outlining the typical factors 
and describing how courts often stray from these factors in their 
attempts to add more fitting criteria or eliminate unhelpful criteria.  
This Section also discusses the varying degrees of scrutiny that courts 
use to assess an expert’s methodology.  Section II.B briefly addresses 
procedural issues regarding gatekeeping under Daubert.  This 
background sets the stage for understanding why the hedgehog-type 
expert is attractive to courts and, correspondingly, why she typically 
gets admitted to testify as an expert even though courts fail to review 
her methodology. 
A. The Daubert Standard 
In describing the Daubert standard, I address two aspects:  (1) the 
set of factors that courts typically rely on, and (2) the degree of rigor 
that courts commonly use when applying these factors.  As shown 
below, courts sometimes stray from the traditional Daubert factors, 
often without explaining the departure, and courts use varying 
degrees of rigor when applying those factors.34  Accordingly, courts 
                                                          
 32. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 33. Evan Kohlmann, the expert described in this Article, relies heavily on 
Internet sources in both his book and his expert witness reports.  See EVAN 
KOHLMANN, AL-QAIDA’S JIHAD IN EUROPE:  THE AFGHAN-BOSNIAN NETWORK 144–45, 227 
(2004) (drawing support from numerous Internet sources).  In one of the cases 
described below, United States v. Amawi, 541 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Ohio 2008), Judge 
Carr referenced the expertise required to use the Internet to track terrorist 
organizations—treating this, in itself, as a form of expertise.  Id. at 949.  Other courts 
have not expressed the same concern for the expertise necessary to gather this type 
of evidence. 
 34. According to one commentator, the “Daubert dicta”—Justice Blackmun’s 
testing considerations—are “more common than the use of other indicia of 
arguments about reliability,” yet “they appear in less than half of all such admissibility 
decisions.”  Robert Robinson, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and the Local 
Construction of Reliability, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 39, 64–65 (2009) (citing Christina 
L. Studebaker & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Expert Testimony in the Courts:   
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are all over the board in using Daubert to fulfill their gatekeeping 
obligation.35 
1. Factors 
Federal courts currently use the test from Daubert,36 as applied to 
nonscientific testimony in Kumho, to screen expert testimony for 
admissibility.37  Daubert was meant to clarify Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence,38 which governs the admissibility of expert 
testimony.  Rule 702 provides as follows: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.39 
                                                          
The Influence of the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Decisions, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
251, 228 (2002)). 
 35. This Section is not meant to criticize Daubert because of courts’ inconsistency 
of application.  Others have done that.  Rather, a basic understanding of Daubert is 
necessary for illustrating my primary point that, given an expert who thinks a certain 
way, the Daubert test may actually mask an unreliable methodology. 
 36. Many state courts have also adopted Daubert as the gatekeeping standard for 
expert testimony.  See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for 
Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5TH 453, 
454–55 (2001) (determining that twenty-five states have adopted Daubert or a similar 
test; fifteen states and the District of Columbia continue to use the Frye v. United States 
“general acceptance” test; six states apply the Daubert factors with an emphasis on 
Frye; and four states have created their own tests).  The same issues discussed in this 
Article would arise as courts apply Daubert in these states.  See David E. Bernstein, 
Keeping Junk Science out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 11, 23 n.72 (2003) (listing 
Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington as Frye states). 
 37. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); United 
States v. Tucker, 345 F.3d 320, 327 (5th Cir. 2003).  In Daubert, the Supreme Court 
rejected the prior “general acceptance” test for admissibility of expert witnesses 
espousing scientific theories and instead adopted the list of nonexclusive factors—
including general acceptance—for deciding the reliability of expert testimony under 
Rule 702.  509 U.S. at 589. 
 38. In 2000, the Federal Advisory Committee amended Rule 702 to comport with 
Daubert and Kumho.  The notes of the Advisory Committee explain that some types of 
expert testimony are more “objectively verifiable” under the Daubert factors than 
other types of testimony.  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.  The 
committee concluded that with some testimony, the courts would have to rely on 
“other standard principles attendant to the particular area of expertise.”  Id. 
 39. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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Courts describe the rule as identifying three necessary prongs for 
admissibility:  the expert must be qualified and her testimony must be 
relevant and reliable.40 
The Supreme Court has advised trial courts to assess the reliability 
of an expert’s theory using the following five factors:  (1) whether the 
theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (2) 
whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant 
scientific community; (3) whether the theory or technique has been 
tested; (4) its known potential error rate; and (5) the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling its operation.41  In Daubert, the 
Court expressly crafted these factors (which I refer to as the “typical” 
Daubert factors) to fit a scientific methodology.42  Specifically, the goal 
of Daubert was, in part, to assist judges in screening out “junk 
science.”43  Justice Blackmun repeatedly referred to the scientific 
method:  “In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony 
pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary 
reliability.”44 
                                                          
 40. See, e.g., Milanowicz v. Raymond Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 525, 530–31 (D.N.J. 
2001) (“As configured in the Third Circuit, Daubert compels a three-part analysis:   
(1) qualifications—whether the expert is qualified to speak with authority on the 
subject at issue; (2) reliability—whether the expert’s methodology is sound and 
whether his or her opinion is supported by ‘good grounds;’ and (3) fit—whether 
there is a relevant ‘connection between the scientific research or test result to be 
presented and particular disputed factual issues in the case.’” (quoting In re Paoli 
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741–43 (3d Cir. 1994))). 
 41. See Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149–50 (1999) (citing 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94).   
 42. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. 
 43. See Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 n.6 (1997) (discussing phrenology 
as the type of “junk science” meant to be excluded by Daubert); Mark S. Brodin, 
Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert:  Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 867, 871 (2005) (explaining that Daubert meant to rule out unreliable expert 
testimony by doing away with the relevant scientific community standard).   
One scholar described the events that preceded Daubert as follows: 
In the mid and late 1980s, critics raised their voices in protest, saying that the 
kind of expertise the courts regularly accepted as admissible was frankly 
“junk” of scandalous lack of dependability.  Voices protested the lack of 
reliability in both criminal and civil spheres, but the voice that finally spoke 
loudest and was heard most clearly, spoke almost exclusively of the injustice 
of junk expertise used against civil defendants.  I refer, of course, to Peter 
Huber and his 1991 book, Galileo’s Revenge, which popularized the phrase 
“junk science.” 
D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”:  Non-Science Forensic Science After 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 767–68 (2000). 
 44. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.  In discussing Rule 702, Justice Blackmun said that 
“[i]ts overarching subject is the scientific validity—and thus the evidentiary relevance 
and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.”  Id. at  
594–95. 
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In Kumho, the Supreme Court relied on the plain language of Rule 
702 to apply the Daubert test to nonscientific areas where “technical 
and other specialized knowledge” is required.45  Justice Breyer 
focused on the “knowledge” requirement of Rule 702:  “[The rule’s] 
language makes no relevant distinction between ‘scientific’ 
knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge.  It makes 
clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert 
testimony.”46  Accordingly, any expert testimony, whether hard 
science, soft science, or nonscientific (experience-based or more 
technical expertise), proffered in federal court or in a Daubert state is 
now subject to Daubert gatekeeping.47 
The Supreme Court described the Daubert/Kumho standard as 
liberal and permissive, giving courts wide latitude in terms of allowing 
expert testimony and deciding how to test expert testimony.48  Justice 
Breyer also emphasized the flexibility of the test, meaning that the 
typical factors neither necessarily nor exclusively apply to every case.49  
The courts’ gatekeeping obligation is chock full of discretion.50  The 
trial court has discretion to decide how to determine reliability,51 just as 
it has discretion to determine the ultimate question of the reliability 
of the conclusions reached.52  Many criticize the standard for its 
                                                          
 45. 526 U.S. at 141.  Kumho involved personal injury claims against the maker 
and distributor of a minivan tire sued after the tire blew out, causing the van to 
overturn in a fatal accident.  Id.  The Supreme Court decision involved the 
admissibility of testimony from the plaintiff’s expert, a mechanical engineer who had 
conducted a visual and tactile inspection of the tires.  Id.  The Supreme Court made 
clear that the Daubert test should be applied to all expert witnesses, including those 
with technical and other specialized knowledge, not just to those with scientific 
evidence.  Id. at 148–49. 
 46. Id. at 147. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 150 (describing the Daubert test as flexible and inclusive).  But see 
Daniel D. Blinka, Expert Testimony and the Relevancy Rule in the Age of Daubert,  
90 MARQ. L. REV. 173, 187–88 (2006) (“[D]espite its promised ‘flexibility’ and the 
purported lowering of barriers to expert assistance, the federal reliability rule’s 
application ‘has been anything but liberal or relaxed’ as trial courts strictly scrutinize 
expert testimony . . . .” (quoting Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 691 
(N.C. 2004))). 
 49. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150. 
 50. See id. (relying on Daubert for the notion that the typical factors do not 
constitute a “definitive checklist or test”). 
 51. In terms of the reliability part of gatekeeping, Judge Harvey Brown suggests 
that courts admit experts whose testimony satisfies three reliability gates:  connective, 
foundational, and methodological reliability.  See Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert 
Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 748–51 (1999).  Judge Brown posits that without all 
three, the expert should not be admitted.  Id. at 749.  Although courts have not 
adopted this classification, I rely on it later to propose a more fitting gatekeeping 
standard for the experts described in this Article. 
 52. See Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (adding to the gatekeeping 
test the court’s role in assessing the reliability of the ultimate conclusion by allowing 
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permissiveness,53 while some complain that it is too stringent.54  
Others complain about the inconsistency in courts’ application of the 
test.55 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has admitted expert 
testimony “even though multiple Daubert factors were not satisfied.”56  
Courts at times add factors (some very broadly phrased and some 
specific) to the typical Daubert list.  These “other” gatekeeping factors 
may include the following:  whether too great an analytical gap exists 
between data and opinion;57 whether the expert has employed the 
same rigor in reaching her litigation-related opinion as she would in 
the non-litigation arena;58 whether the expert accounted for obvious 
alternative explanations;59 and whether the expert conducted the 
                                                          
the court to determine that a conclusion makes too large a leap from the supporting 
data). 
 53. In her note concerning judicial confusion over Daubert, Cassandra Welch 
identified differences in how the circuits and various judges apply Daubert.  Cassandra 
H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review:  Daubert’s Legacy of Confusion,  
29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1097–98 (2006).  She notes that while the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit requires that trial courts “consider all factors listed 
by Daubert as well as any other relevant factors,” the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits use the Daubert factors like the hearsay exception for 
business records.  Id. 
 54. See Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament:  Determining ‘Reliable’ 
Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 321 (2000) (criticizing Daubert’s 
stringency and lack of clarity for leading to conflicting and confusing decisions); 
Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 281, 283 (2007) (citing the 2001 RAND Institute for Civil Justice study of 400 
federal court decisions regarding Daubert to support the notion that “[t]he 
gatekeeping role bestowed upon the judiciary has blocked more court access than it 
has enabled”). 
 55. See Robinson, supra note 34, at 42 (“Law is most effective in guiding judicial 
behavior when the law has a relatively clear rule, a relatively clear substantive 
meaning, or where judges face meaningful appellate oversight.  Daubert decisions fit 
none of these criteria.”); Welch, supra note 53, at 1098–99 (describing how judges 
are unclear on how to weigh and combine the factors, noting a judicial survey in 
which half of those who responded were weighing general acceptance the most 
heavily out of all the factors). 
 56. See United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115, 1123 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 
United States v. Norris, 217 F.3d 262, 269–71 (5th Cir. 2000)) (holding that 
testimony may be admissible even if it does not satisfy two of the four or five factors). 
 57. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (holding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony linking 
deaths among workers to chemical exposure, thereby validating the district court’s 
reasoning that the gap between the data and the expert opinion was too great). 
 58. This is simply the Daubert concept of employing intellectual rigor articulated 
as a specific factor.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 
(1993). 
 59. See, e.g., Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(discussing efforts to rule out other possible causes of injuries). 
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research independent of litigation.60  Courts display significant 
inconsistency in electing when (i.e., in what type of case, with what 
type of expert, etc.) to reach outside the typical Daubert factors; also, 
courts rarely explain their reasons for doing so. 
At times, courts simply conflate the qualifications and reliability 
requirements, looking at observations, professional experience, 
education, and training as indicia of reliability.61  In some decisions, 
emphasizing qualifications while barely addressing methodology 
appears deliberate.  In fact, Judge Harvey Brown posits that courts 
should rely primarily on qualifications as a reliability factor when the 
expert’s specialized knowledge derives from experience rather than 
from a particular methodology.62  He cites Professor Imwinkelried for 
the idea that “for experience-based expert testimony, reliability 
should focus on the breadth of the expert’s detailed experiences.”63  
And while this certainly makes sense, using observations and training 
as indicia of reliability for certain types of expertise (e.g., the police 
investigator testifying as an expert about a criminal modus operandi 
based on the officer’s thirty years of experience and training), the 
court should still examine the expert’s methodology and explain the 
court’s reason for leaning so heavily on qualifications to decide 
reliability. 
Ultimately, the reliability of an expert’s methodology is critical to 
the trustworthiness of her conclusions; yet, courts often fail to 
scrutinize it, particularly when the nature of the expertise is foreign 
                                                          
 60. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(describing this issue as “a very significant fact to be considered”). 
 61. Commentators argue that for certain types of expertise, these factors are 
much more suitable for testing the reliability of methodology than are the four 
“typical” factors because of trial courts’ idealized views of hard sciences.  David S. 
Caudill & Lewis L. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy Need to Know about 
the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—and Not Just the Methodological—Aspects of Science, 
45 B.C. L. REV. 1, 33 (2003); see In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 n.8 
(3d Cir. 1994) (listing the qualifications of the expert as one of the factors for 
determining the reliability of scientific evidence in the Third Circuit). 
 62. See Brown, supra note 51, at 830.  Judge Brown identifies eight gates through 
which an expert’s testimony must pass for admissibility.  The testimony must satisfy 
the following tests:  (1) assist the trier of fact; (2) pass the qualifications requirement; 
(3) satisfy the relevance test; (4) pass the reliability test in terms of methodology 
(“methodological reliability”); (5) satisfy the “connective reliability” requirement by 
ensuring that the connection between the opinion and the conclusion is sound;  
(6) pass the “foundational reliability” test by ensuring the foundation underlying an 
expert’s opinion is reliable; (7) satisfy the “foundational data” reliability test; and  
(8) pass the “unfair prejudice” test.  Id. at 746–51.  He identifies three separate 
reliability gates:  foundational, methodological, and connective.  Id. at 828–29. 
 63. Id. at 834 (citing Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2292).  Brown’s position is 
essentially that these experts are not employing a methodology for a particular case, 
as opposed to technical experts. 
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to the court.64  The obvious irony is that the more elusive the nature 
of expertise (thus suggesting the need for an exacting analysis), the 
more lax the courts’ scrutiny of methodology. 
2. Degrees of Rigor 
The second troubling aspect of Daubert is the varying degrees of 
rigor with which trial courts currently apply the standard.  To fulfill 
their gatekeeping obligation, some courts treat the standard as 
exacting, while other courts gloss over the factors, paying only scant 
attention to whether the methodology satisfies any test. 
In addition, some courts look to the “types” of experts and apply 
the reliability test to the type, rather than to the individual expert’s 
methodology.  I use the phrase “categorical review” to describe a 
review where courts evaluate a type of expert—a fingerprinting 
expert, for example—and deem the type admissible without 
analyzing the expert’s methodology.  In United States v. Crisp,65 for 
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit assessed 
the reliability of fingerprinting experts in general, without assessing 
the methodology of the government’s expert.66  On appeal, the 
defendant challenged the admission of the fingerprinting experts on 
the grounds that fingerprint analysis had no established error rate.67  
The Fourth Circuit summarily rejected the argument, finding that 
courts and other fingerprinting experts had routinely accepted this 
type of expertise as reliable:  “While [the defendant] may be correct 
that further research, more searching scholarly review, and the 
development of even more consistent professional standards is 
desirable, he has offered us no reason to reject outright a form of 
evidence that has so ably withstood the test of time.”68  In a strong 
dissent, Judge Michael posited that the majority had improperly 
                                                          
 64. See, e.g., infra Part II.B (surveying cases in which courts engaged in little or no 
scrutiny of the expert’s methodology when admitting testimony concerning the 
origins, operations, and ideology of terrorist networks). 
 65. 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 66. See id. at 269 (“[T]he district court was well within its discretion in accepting 
at face value the consensus of the expert and judicial communities that the 
fingerprint identification technique is reliable.”). 
 67. Id. at 268. 
 68. Id. at 269.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit provides virtually 
no review and shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that the expertise is not 
reliable.  See id. 
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“grandfathered” fingerprint evidence, failing to analyze it under the 
existing Daubert standard.69 
Similarly, in United States v. Williams,70 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit described, with approval, the lower court’s cursory 
Daubert review, in which the trial court first noted the firearms 
expert’s qualifications and then based its reliability determination on 
those qualifications and the fact that the expert had testified in prior 
cases.71  While describing the expert’s qualifications, the court noted 
approvingly “her prior expert testimony on between 20 and 30 
occasions.”72  The Second Circuit agreed with the trial court’s 
reasoning, making the confusing statement:  “The trial court’s 
admission of Kuehner’s testimony constituted an implicit 
determination that there was a sufficient basis for doing so.”73 
In similarly cursory reviews, some trial courts admit expert 
testimony simply because the expert professes that her methodology 
is reliable.  In a decision out of the Western District of Texas, the 
court found an expert’s methodology reliable because he had  
co-authored two books in the pertinent field, and because he 
“testified that his opinions are based on his knowledge as one of 
ordinary skill in the art, and that he is ‘100 percent knowledgeable of 
the opinions that are expressed.’”74 
As this Article discusses below, a number of courts have engaged in 
a relaxed review of Kohlmann’s proposed testimony, focusing on his 
qualifications and the magnitude of his collection of data regarding 
international terrorism.75  Courts tend to rely heavily on the fact that 
prior courts have admitted Kohlmann’s testimony, treating those 
prior decisions as precedent for the court’s admissibility decision. 
In contrast, in a “strict scrutiny” review, a trial court carefully 
studies an expert’s methodology in the context of her field.  For 
example, in United States v. Masferrer,76 the trial court assessed the 
                                                          
 69. Id. at 272 (Michael, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government failed to 
prove that the expert identification evidence satisfied the Daubert standard or that it 
was otherwise reliable). 
 70. 506 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 71. Id. at 161–62. 
 72. Id. at 161. 
 73. Id. (qualifying the court’s opinion by stating that it should not be “taken as 
saying that any proffered ballistic expert should be routinely admitted”). 
 74. See Oilfield Equip. Mktg., Inc. v. New Tech Sys., Inc., No. MO-02-CA-183, 2004 
WL 5499507, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2004). 
 75. See infra Part II.B (surveying the scrutiny that courts have applied to the 
proffered testimony of Kohlmann in terrorism cases). 
 76. 367 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2005). 
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reliability of an expert on banking transactions.77  The expert was a 
professor of international finance law, international trade law, and 
international banking transactions.78  The government hired the 
expert to opine on a series of transactions; the expert would testify at 
trial that the loans at issue were not independent transactions but 
were instead swap exchanges.79 
In assessing the reliability of the expert’s methodology, the trial 
court outlined what material the expert had reviewed and how he 
had reached his conclusions.80  The trial court also noted what 
material the expert had not reviewed in arriving at his conclusions.81  
Based on these omissions, the trial court ruled that the expert was not 
reliable.82  In doing so, the court conducted an “exacting analysis” of 
the expert’s methodology, looking closely at how the expert arrived 
at his conclusions.  For better or worse, this assessment reflects an 
entirely different gatekeeping standard than the standard employed 
in the cases described above. 
The purpose of this Article is not to identify which circuits are 
applying rigorous review in which types of cases, but rather to 
highlight the absence of a consistent standard.  Courts differ both in 
terms of factors used and degree of rigor applied, such that in some 
cases, judges scrutinize expert methodology meticulously, while in 
other decisions, judges relax their scrutiny, ignoring parts of the 
                                                          
 77. Id. at 1375–76. 
 78. Id. at 1374. 
 79. Id. at 1375. 
 80. See id. at 1374–75 (identifying the exact materials used by the expert to 
conduct his analysis, including trade slips, faxes, emails, and other internal 
memoranda). 
 81. Id. at 1375.  The trial court noted the specific material that the expert 
omitted from his review: 
[The expert] (1) did not look at the fundamentals of the loans or the 
borrowers; (2) did not look at whether the loans were repaid; (3) did not 
look at whether or not the OCC required reserves on these loans; (4) did not 
look at whether any payments on these loans were affected by the 
moratorium; (5) did not do other research on value; and (6) did not review 
Hamilton Bank’s portfolio. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 82. See id. at 1375–76 (finding that “[the expert’s] proposed testimony [was] 
merely conclusory, unreliable, and fail[ed] to specifically identify the methodology 
or reasoning he used” to arrive at his conclusions). 
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assessment or applying such mild scrutiny that it is almost absent.83  
The result is a standardless standard.84 
B. Procedure 
1. To Hear or Not to Hear 
Generally, federal appellate courts do not require a Daubert 
hearing, though some circuits require that the record reflect a trial 
court’s Daubert findings.85  In a recent case involving a firearms 
identification expert, the Second Circuit agreed with the trial court 
that a separate hearing concerning the Daubert challenge was not 
necessary.86  According to the Second Circuit, before presenting the 
expert to the jury, the government “provided an exhaustive 
foundation for [the expert’s] expertise.”87  The court also highlighted 
that the expert had testified on twenty to thirty prior occasions.88  
                                                          
 83. Again, an empirical study of which judges, in which types of cases (i.e., civil 
or criminal), with which types of experts (i.e., soft or hard science), employ which 
standards (and to what degree) is not the purpose of this Article.  Yet, someone 
could undertake such a study. 
 84. Commentators Kanner and Casey have criticized the exacting scrutiny that 
some judges use in applying Daubert, objecting that Daubert has become a common 
tool for keeping cases from going to trial: 
Daubert, with its many criteria, allows a judge to focus on just one criteria, 
weigh it unevenly, and use it to prevent expert testimony (in many cases 
central to a plaintiff’s entire case) from reaching the courtroom. . . . With 
remarkable speed, judges have gone far beyond throwing the clinical 
ecologists out of the courtroom.  Impressed by artful defense counsels’ 
smoke screens, they are now excluding testimony of well-regarded experts. 
Kanner & Casey, supra note 54, at 306 (citations omitted).  In light of this 
commentary, Daubert comes across as an entirely different type of test.  See Robinson, 
supra note 34, at 68–69 (“[O]ne emerging scholarly consensus views federal courts as 
taking a relatively liberal position in criminal cases (particularly where the state’s 
evidence is concerned) while being much more restrictive in civil cases.”). 
 85. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit acknowledged that Daubert 
probably requires some sort of preliminary determination of admissibility, but the 
court has held that lower courts are not required to act sua sponte in making explicit 
rulings on the record concerning expert testimony.  See Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1,  
4–5 (1st Cir. 1995) (concluding that the trial court need only “consider” making a 
ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony).  The Fourth Circuit does not require 
a hearing.  See United States v. Davis, 602 F. Supp. 2d 658, 663 (D. Md. 2009) (“It is 
clear that a court is not required to hold a hearing simply because a party has raised 
a Daubert issue.”).  Nor does the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.   
See Oilfield Equip. Mktg., Inc. v. New Tech Sys., Inc., No. MO-02-CA-183, 2004 WL 
5499507, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2004) (“A trial court is not required to hold a 
Daubert hearing before ruling on the admissibility of scientific evidence.”). 
 86. United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 162 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for a 
Daubert hearing). 
 87. Id. at 161. 
 88. Id. 
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Thus, the trial court was not required to hold a separate Daubert 
hearing.89 
Other appellate courts draw on a range of factors when 
determining whether a Daubert hearing is necessary.  The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that a Daubert trial is not 
required where the expert has extensive experience and provides 
relatively straightforward evidence that is easy to follow.90  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, has held 
that a trial court abuses its discretion in a criminal trial by not 
holding a Daubert hearing before excluding expert testimony that is 
heavily relied upon.91  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit takes a hybrid approach, requiring a Daubert hearing when a 
party seeks to offer expert testimony on a complex issue.92  The court 
also requires a Daubert hearing when an expert’s methodology is 
difficult to determine and the expert’s conclusions thus cannot be 
verified.93  Thus, certain circuits require greater accountability from 
trial courts than other appellate courts.  The trial courts in these 
circuits must make specific findings on the record regarding the 
reliability of the expert’s methodology.94  The appellate court can 
then review the “sufficiently developed record” to ensure that the 
trial court satisfied its gatekeeping requirement.95  Accordingly, while 
these circuits do not require a separate Daubert hearing, trial courts 
must make sufficient findings on the record to (presumably) allow 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 162. 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 543 F.3d 509, 514–15 (9th Cir. 
2008) (explaining that the testimony from the expert—a border patrol agent— 
“was neither rocket science nor complex statistical modeling”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
1021 (2009). 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(concluding that the trial court should have held a Daubert hearing on the reliability 
of eyewitness identification where the prosecution’s case relied almost entirely on 
eyewitness accounts). 
 92. See, e.g., Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711–12 (W.D. Pa. 
2005) (noting that toxic exposure cases present many complex issues and that the 
Third Circuit had required a Daubert hearing in similar circumstances (citing Padillas 
v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 1999))). 
 93. See, e.g., Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 155 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting 
that a Daubert hearing is necessary if the court is unable to determine how the expert 
reached her opinion (citing Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 745 (3d Cir. 
2000))). 
 94. See, e.g., Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Kumho 
and Daubert make it clear that the [trial] court must, on the record, make some kind 
of reliability determination.” (quoting United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1209 
(10th Cir. 2000))). 
 95. See, e.g., id. (concluding that the absence of detailed findings as to the 
reliability of the expert testimony must lead the appellate court to find that the trial 
court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony). 
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for meaningful appellate review.  Again, courts are afforded 
discretion in deciding the procedures for Daubert decision-making. 
2. Proponent’s Burden 
Courts also apply the proponent’s burden inconsistently.  Pursuant 
to Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 702, the party proffering an 
expert witness must establish that the testimony is admissible (i.e., the 
expert is qualified and the testimony is relevant and reliable) by a 
preponderance of the evidence.96 
Although the burden lies with the proponent of the expert to 
establish admissibility, courts frequently require the party challenging 
the expert to establish the absence of reliability.  For instance, in a 
recent case involving faulty reporting of truck-driver backgrounds, 
the plaintiff truck drivers called a political science professor to testify 
as to the accuracy of reporting practices.97  In assessing the reliability 
of the plaintiff’s expert’s methodology and conclusions, the trial 
court admitted the expert, holding that the reliability question 
should go to the weight of the expert’s testimony because the 
defendant “[had] not demonstrated that the basis of [the expert’s] 
opinion testimony [was] so unreliable in these areas that the 
testimony should not be admitted.”98  Accordingly, the trial court 
admitted the testimony because the party challenging the expert had 
not shown the absence of reliability (rather than requiring the 
plaintiff to establish the reliability of the expert’s methodology).99  
Thus, in terms of general problems with Daubert gatekeeping, courts 
tend to stray from the mandate that they impose the burden of 
establishing admissibility on the expert’s proponent. 
3. Appellate Review 
Today, in practice, appellate courts vary significantly in terms of 
how searchingly they review trial court admissibility decisions.  As 
shown above, some appellate courts carefully examine the expert’s 
                                                          
 96. FED. R. EVID. 104(a); FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“[T]he 
admissibility of all expert testimony is governed by the principles of Rule 104(a).”); 
Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“Daubert 
instructs us that the district court must determine admissibility under Rule 702 by 
following the directions provided in Rule 104(a).”). 
 97. Owner-Operator Indep. Driver Ass’n v. Usis Commercial Serv., No. 04-cv-
01384-REB-CBS, 2006 WL 2164661, at *3–4 (D. Colo. July 31, 2006). 
 98. Id. at *4. 
 99. See id. (finding instead that areas of questionable reliability are “ripe for cross-
examination”). 
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methodology to decide whether the trial court got it right,100 while 
others rubber-stamp the trial court’s decision.101 
In theory, appellate courts are to review trial court admissibility 
decisions for abuse of discretion and sustain the decisions unless they 
are manifestly erroneous.102  Commentators have advocated for de 
novo appellate review, arguing that such review would be more 
meaningful103 and that it would promote uniformity with certain 
“trans-case” issues.104  Yet, this proposal is certainly not the panacea 
for the problems described herein.  Rather, it would merely shift the 
problem from trial courts (which lack standards and guidance) to 
appellate courts (which also lack standards and guidance), with the 
added detriment of enormous inefficiency.  Accordingly, I do not 
advocate shifting to de novo review, but rather rejuvenating Daubert so 
trial courts can (and will) adequately account for how an expert 
approaches an issue. 
This brings us to the fox and the hedgehog.  As shown, the Daubert 
factors were meant to fulfill a particular objective relating to 
reliability of scientific expertise.  Courts now apply these factors  
(in varying forms and using varying degrees of rigor) to test reliability 
of all types of expert testimony.  Yet, when viewing expertise through 
the lens of Berlin’s fox/hedgehog dichotomy, the factors are not only 
                                                          
 100. See, e.g., Jahn v. Equine Svcs., PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 392–93 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding two veterinarian 
experts’ testimony and finding instead that the experts’ opinions were “based on 
undisputed objective medical facts” and “scientifically-based methodology” and 
therefore admissible). 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding 
no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of testimony without a Daubert 
hearing). 
 102. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1997); Satcher v. Honda 
Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Christophersen v. Allied-Signal 
Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 (1992)). 
 103. As one hopeful scholar imagined: 
Finally, a time may come when the courts rule that the abuse of discretion 
standard used in reviewing admissibility may have to be changed to a de novo 
review standard.  De novo appellate decisions based on Daubert would allow 
examination of the expert testimony, not merely the actions of the trial 
judge, and thus provide a higher level of review in admissibility rulings. 
Todd R. Samelman, Comment, Junk Science in Federal Courts:  Judicial Understanding of 
Scientific Principles, 6 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 263, 271 (2001).  But see CAUDILL & LARUE, 
supra note 14, at 64–65 (contending that arguments for de novo review represent  
“an idealization of appellate judges as the solution to the problem of bad science in 
the courtroom”). 
 104. See Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert:  An Evolving Jurisprudence of 
Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 234 (2000) (“Thus, appellate courts should 
review case-specific evidence rulings deferentially and trans-case scientific issues de 
novo, and lower courts should treat appellate decisions on trans-case scientific issues 
as they would holdings of law.”). 
  
656 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:635 
 
ill-suited but also, at times, wholly at odds with the underlying 
objectives of Daubert. 
II. THE FOX, THE HEDGEHOG, AND BIAS:  WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE 
HEDGEHOG (OR THE FOX) TESTIFIES AS AN EXPERT WITNESS 
Berlin’s dichotomy shows why courts, to vet expert testimony 
effectively, should consider how an expert thinks, rather than simply 
what an expert thinks.105  Berlin characterized Dante, Plato, 
Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche as hedgehogs; he considered Shakespeare, 
Aristotle, and Joyce to be foxes.106  He described the hedgehog types, 
known for their dogged persistence, as those who “relate everything 
to a single central vision, one system, less or more coherent or 
articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel.”107  
Foxes, presumably because they are shrewd and cunning, “entertain 
ideas that are centrifugal rather than centripetal; their thought is 
scattered and diffused, moving on many levels, seizing upon the 
essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects.”108 
I characterize Evan Kohlmann, the expert most frequently 
proffered by the government in the group of cases this Article 
describes below, as a hedgehog-type expert.  Kohlmann has achieved 
celebrity status as a specialist in tracking terrorists.109  He runs a 
counterterrorism blog, has authored a book on counterterrorism, 
and frequently comments on NBC News about counterterrorism 
issues.110  Courts routinely admit Kohlmann to testify on the 
background, origin, and structure of terrorist organizations, despite 
forceful defense objections concerning the reliability of Kohlmann’s 
methodology. 
                                                          
 105. Cf. Eric Schurenberg, Why the Experts Missed the Crash, CNN MONEY.COM,  
Feb. 18, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/17/pf/experts_Tetlock.moneymag/ 
index.htm?postversion=2009021808 (finding the fox/hedgehog distinction to be 
predictive of the accuracy of economic and policy experts). 
 106. BERLIN, supra note 2, at 437. 
 107. Id. at 436. 
 108. Id. at 436–37. 
 109. See Robert Strauss, Terrorists Beware:  Kohlmann Is on the Case, PENN LAW 
JOURNAL, Fall 2006, http://www.law.upenn.edu/alumni/alumnijournal/Fall2006/ 
feature3/kohlmann.html (profiling Kohlmann as one of five “All-Star” graduates of 
the University of Pennsylvania Law School for his work as an expert on counter-
terrorism).  After the 9/11 attacks, Kohlmann said, “Doing a sort of scientific 
research like I had and then seeing it on TV, well, it was completely different.   
I turned to a classmate and said, ‘This is Osama Bin Laden, and I have to go do 
something about it.’”  Id. 
 110. Id. 
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A. The Fox and the Hedgehog 
In the early 1950s, philosopher Isaiah Berlin used the 
fox/hedgehog distinction to illustrate different cognitive styles.111  
Berlin compared the hedgehog’s single, focused worldview and 
vision, which informs all of its opinions, with the fox’s more diffuse, 
cautious, and open-minded approach.112  Foxes tend toward self-
doubt and are thus more likely to adjust their views as necessary, 
while hedgehogs tend toward more extreme positions.113  In his essay, 
Berlin posits that Leo Tolstoy was a fox who wanted to be a 
hedgehog.114 
In the early 1990s, paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould applied the 
fox/hedgehog distinction to his ideal of science and humanities 
joining forces to achieve a greater good.115  He described the 
fox/hedgehog differences in intellectual approaches as follows: 
Foxes (the great ones, not the shallow or showy grazers) owe their 
reputation to a light (but truly entertaining) spread of real genius 
across many fields of study, applying their varied skills to introduce 
a key and novel fruit for other scholars to gather and improve . . . . 
Hedgehogs (the great ones, not the pedants) locate one vitally 
important mine, where their particular and truly special gifts 
cannot be matched.116 
Gould did not favor one approach in his book; rather, he described 
the virtues of both styles and expressed the ideal of the two 
combined, like the ideal of science and humanities conjoined.117 
Professor Philip Tetlock used Berlin’s distinction to categorize two 
different types of political forecasters:  ones with a single, dominant 
worldview and ones with a more scattered, diffuse view of things.118  
According to Tetlock, how forecasters approach an issue is a much 
more significant factor in likelihood of success than education or 
experience.119  “The propensity of hedgehogs to push their favorite 
first principles as far as possible, and sometimes beyond, arose on 
                                                          
 111. BERLIN, supra note 2, at 436. 
 112. Id. at 436–37. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 438 (finding that the fox/hedgehog distinction between Tolstoy’s 
nature and his beliefs was reflected most clearly in Tolstoy’s view of history). 
 115. Gould, supra note 1, at 5. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 5–6. 
 118. TETLOCK, supra note 6. 
 119. Id. at 106, 117–18; see also Schurenberg, supra note 105 (interviewing Philip 
Tetlock about the results of his survey in which he tracked 82,000 predictions by 284 
experts and assessed the validity of their responses). 
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numerous occasions.”120  He describes the virtues of the fox-like 
approach (or the detriments to the hedgehog approach) as follows:  
“Once many hedgehogs boarded a train of thought, they let it run 
full throttle in one policy direction for extended stretches, with 
minimal braking for obstacles that foxes took as signs they were on 
the wrong track.”121 
Tetlock posits that hedgehogs—who are more apt to simply cast 
aside contradictory evidence because it conflicts with their worldview, 
without assessing how it may impact the analysis or why it is 
contradictory—are more appealing to the media because of their 
steadfast positions and their ability to articulate their positions in 
compelling sound bites.122   
In the political forecasting arena, Tetlock has a bias:  he favors the 
fox for accuracy.123  Tetlock describes attributes of the fox in political 
forecasting as follows:  “[F]oxes are still wary of grand 
generalizations:  they draw lessons from history that are riddled with 
probabilistic loopholes and laced with contingencies and 
paradoxes.”124  Foxes are more open-minded and willing to integrate 
contrary evidence or approaches; thus, with regard to the USSR in 
1988, Tetlock explained:  “The greater emotional detachment of 
foxes proved helpful during the endgame phase of the glasnost and 
perestroika period.  Some foxes had a remarkable flair for piecing 
together discordant arguments . . . .”125 
Hedgehogs, on the other hand, “dig themselves into intellectual 
holes.”126  Yet, because of the hedgehogs’ eagerness for resolution 
with a sure, simple answer, the media favors the hedgehog.127  Tetlock 
posits that this is because “simple, decisive statements are easier to 
package in sound bites.”128  So, as Tetlock concludes, the attributes 
that detract from their ability to accurately forecast the future make 
hedgehogs appealing political pundits.129 
                                                          
 120.  TETLOCK, supra note 6, at 89. 
 121. Id. at 100. 
 122. Id. at 119.  In her review of Tetlock’s book, Ellen Goodman said this of media 
experts:  “In our media world, the more certain the expert, the more celebrated.  
And yet the more celebrated, the more likely he or she is to be wrong.”  Ellen 
Goodman, Hedgehogs and Foxes, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 30, 2005, at A19. 
 123. TETLOCK, supra note 6, at 117–18. 
 124. Id. at 144–45. 
 125. Id. at 107. 
 126. Id. at 118. 
 127. Id. at 119. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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In describing the end result, Tetlock concludes that while “[f]oxes 
are not awe-inspiring forecasters,” they avoid “many of the big 
mistakes that drive down the probability scores of hedgehogs to 
approximate parity with dart-throwing chimps.”130  Tetlock also 
concludes that the fox is more often right—this expert is typically a 
better predictor of political and economic outcomes because of her 
more resilient approach.131 
I borrow Berlin’s classification—which Tetlock applies to experts in 
the political-strategy arena—and apply it to nonscientific experts in 
the courtroom arena.132  This dichotomy demonstrates, in a way that 
is different than past illustrations, the peril of continuing to rely on 
our existing Daubert gatekeeping system, and gives courts a reason to 
take seriously the need to reconstruct Daubert.  As shown below, 
hedgehog-type experts like Kohlmann typically are compelling 
witnesses for the media, the government, the jury, and—perhaps 
most importantly—the judge, who typically admits this expert despite 
Daubert objections regarding reliability and qualifications. 
B. Evan Kohlmann—“Celebrity Expert” 
Evan Kohlmann, who has been admitted to testify as the 
government’s expert witness in at least fifteen terrorism trials in this 
country,133 has been called “the Doogie Howser of terrorism” because 
Kohlmann was relatively young when he became a popular, self-made 
expert on this subject.134  He refers to himself as a “private sector 
International Terrorism Consultant who has spent over a decade 
tracking Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations.”135 
Kohlmann has an undergraduate degree in international politics 
from Georgetown University and a law degree from the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School.136  He contributes to the Counterterrorism 
                                                          
 130. Id. at 118. 
 131. See Schurenberg, supra note 105 (“The better forecasters were like Berlin’s 
foxes:  self-critical, eclectic thinkers who were willing to update their beliefs when 
faced with contrary evidence . . . .” (quoting Philip Tetlock in an interview)). 
 132. The distinction can also be applied to scientific experts.  See GOULD, supra 
note 5. 
 133. Global Terror Alert, About Evan Kohlmann, http://www.globalterroralert. 
com/about/11-research-partners/8-about-evan-kohlmann.html (last visited Feb. 3, 
2010). 
 134. See Tom Mills, Evan Kohlmann; the Doogie Howser of Terrorism?, SPINWATCH,  
Apr. 29, 2008, http://www.spinwatch.org/-articles-by-category-mainmenu-8/74-
terror-spin/4850- (comparing Kohlmann to Doogie Howser, the main character in a 
television sitcom about a boy who became a well-respected doctor when he was 
fourteen years old). 
 135. Global Terror Alert, supra note 133. 
 136. Id. 
  
660 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:635 
 
Blog137 and is “an exclusive on-air terrorism analyst for NBC News.”138  
Kohlmann wrote a book about terrorist networks in Bosnia while he 
was in law school.139  In the United States (and possibly abroad), he is 
something of a celebrity terrorism expert.140 
Kohlmann is also known for creating a video about al-Qaida that 
the government uses during trials of Guantánamo prisoners.141  The 
ninety-minute video, called “The Al Qaeda Plan” (to make it 
reminiscent of “the Nazi Plan” film used during the Nuremberg 
trials), depicts, for example, mangled corpses after the 1998 U.S. 
Embassy bombing in Kenya.142  According to the military tribunal’s 
chief prosecutor, Army Colonel Lawrence Morris, the film was meant 
to stir emotions:  “It is prejudicial, which is why we show it.”143 
I use the five cases below to illustrate the nature of Kohlmann’s 
proposed testimony (based on his expert reports) and the typical 
court scrutiny of Kohlmann’s methodology (their Daubert analysis) 
before admitting him to testify.  Courts have admitted Kohlmann to 
testify in ten other federal court cases in this country, reviewing his 
expertise in much the same way as in the cases described below.144 
Kohlmann’s expert reports reflect a single, unwavering worldview 
concerning the structure, organization, and background of the 
organizations he tracks, and (more importantly) the forces driving 
the individuals, publications, and organizations associated with those 
organizations.145  Typically, the defendant in these cases is charged 
with supporting (by supplying classified information to or providing 
funding for) a particular terrorist source or organization, knowing or 
intending that the support be used to kill United States nationals.146  
                                                          
 137. Counterterrorism Blog, http://counterterrorismblog.org/ (last visited  
Feb. 3, 2010).  Kohlmann describes his blog as “[t]he first multi-expert blog 
dedicated solely to counterterrorism issues.”  Id. 
 138. Global Terror Alert, supra note 133. 
 139. EVAN KOHLMANN, AL-QAIDA’S JIHAD IN EUROPE:  THE AFGHAN-BOSNIAN 
NETWORK (Berg 2004). 
 140. Global Terror Alert, supra, note 133.  Kohlmann has also testified as a 
terrorism expert in cases in the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Id. 
 141. Carol J. Williams, Guantanamo Jurors Shown Graphic Film on Al Qaeda, L.A. 
TIMES, July 29, 2008, at A8 (noting that Kohlmann was paid $20,000 to produce the 
film and $25,000 to appear before the war crimes tribunal). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Global Terror Alert, supra note 133 (noting that Kohlmann has provided 
testimony in fifteen federal cases). 
 145. See generally EVAN F. KOHLMANN, EXPERT REPORT:  U.S. V. HASSAN ABU JIHAAD 
(2007), http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/abujihaadexpertreport.pdf. 
 146. Typically, these cases are prosecuted under the material support to terrorism 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000), which provides that “[w]hoever . . . knowingly 
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In his expert reports, Kohlmann deftly links a particular Arabic 
publication, website, or organization (typically the one the defendant 
allegedly supported) to terrorist recruitment.147  He then establishes 
the link between recruiting terrorists and Osama Bin Laden.148   
And then, obviously, he links Bin Laden to the jihadist objective of 
killing American nationals.149  In these cases, Kohlmann repeatedly, 
vividly,150 and emphatically highlights these connections throughout 
his expert reports. 
In United States v. Abu-Jihaad,151 the government proffered 
Kohlmann to testify in a case against defendant Hassan Abu-Jihaad 
for supplying classified information to Azzam Publications.152  As part 
of its burden, the government was required to prove that Abu-Jihaad 
provided material support to Azzam Publications “knowing or 
intending that the support be used to kill United States nationals.”153  
The government called Kohlmann to testify as to “the history, 
structure, and goals of al Qaeda, the recruitment of Muslim fighters, 
mujahideen activities in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan . . . and 
the role of Azzam Publications among the mujahideen.”154  Judge 
Kravitz permitted Kohlmann’s testimony on these issues, but he 
excluded any of Kohlmann’s testimony regarding the defendant 
himself or his motivations.155 
In his nineteen-page expert report, Kohlmann identified Azzam 
Publications as the “undisputed top mujahideen propaganda site on 
the Internet,”156 describing it as follows: 
Over time, several shadowy U.K.-based entities have gained 
notorious reputations for independently translating Al-Qaida 
                                                          
provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or 
attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title,” id. 
 147. See, e.g., KOHLMANN, supra note 145, at 9 (linking Azzam Publications to 
terrorist recruitment). 
 148. See, e.g., id. at 3 (discussing Azzam’s terrorist recruitment as furthering  
al-Qaida’s goals as intended by Osama Bin Laden, Azzam, and others who formed  
al-Qaida). 
 149. See, e.g., id. at 3–4 (noting the al-Qaida terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole). 
 150. The language in Kohlmann’s expert reports is not histrionic, though he 
certainly uses language effectively to create vivid images of whatever he is describing. 
 151. 553 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 152. Allegedly, Azzam Publications played a role in disseminating information 
supporting al-Qaida and the mujahideen.  See id. at 124. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 123. 
 155. See id. at 127 (noting that Kohlmann should not testify directly about the 
defendant’s motivations to order jihadi videos from Azzam Publications because it 
would “usurp[] the jury’s function” (citing United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 
54 (2d Cir. 2003))). 
 156. KOHLMANN, supra note 145, at 9. 
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multimedia and re-releasing videos in English for the purposes of 
terrorist recruitment—but perhaps none more so than Azzam 
Publications in London.  Between approximately the years of 1996 
and 2002, Azzam Publications reigned . . . featuring jihad training 
manuals, interviews with Al-Qaida leaders and associates, and the 
stories of many fallen jihadi ‘martyrs.’157 
Kohlmann described the relationship between the man Azzam 
(whom Kohlmann identified as “overwhelmingly accepted and 
revered as the ‘godfather’ of modern military jihad”)158 and his “top 
student” Osama Bin Laden.  And, providing background on al-Qaida, 
he went on to describe a meeting convened by Osama Bin Laden: 
Bin Laden and other Middle Eastern terrorist leaders in 
attendance jointly agreed that ‘the ruling to kill the Americans and 
their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every 
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do 
it.’159 
Kohlmann included in his report the “final call” of Azzam:   
“We shall continue the Jihad no matter how long the way is until the 
last breath and the last beating of the pulse or we see the Islamic state 
established.”160 
In terms of his methodology, Kohlmann included one paragraph at 
the beginning of his expert report in Abu-Jihaad describing his 
methods as follows: 
As part of my research beginning in approximately 1997, I have 
traveled overseas to interview known terrorist recruiters and 
organizers (such as Abu Hamza al-Masri) and to attend 
underground conferences and rallies; I have reviewed thousands of 
open source documents; and, I have amassed one of the largest 
digital collections of terrorist multimedia and propaganda in the 
world.  The open source documents in my collection include sworn 
legal affidavits, original court exhibits, video and audio recordings, 
text communiqués, and eyewitness testimonies.161 
Kohlmann went on to list the other cases in which he had testified 
“as an approved expert witness” and quoted another court’s decision 
admitting him to testify.162 
                                                          
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 2. 
 159. Id. at 3 (citing Text of the World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews 
and Crusaders, AL QUDS AL ARABI (London), Feb. 23, 1998). 
 160. Id. at 3 (citing Dr. Abdallah Azzam, Al-Qa’ida, AL-JIHAD, Apr. 1988, No. 41, at 
46). 
 161. Id. at 1. 
 162. See id. at 1–2 (“Evan Kohlmann has sufficient education, training and 
knowledge to be qualified as an expert . . . [his] methodology [consists] of gathering 
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In assessing the reliability of Kohlmann’s testimony, Judge Kravitz 
noted that Kohlmann was “relatively young to be an expert,” yet  
“he applies to his expert testimony the same social science 
methodologies that he learned at Georgetown University and that are 
applied to other subjects that cannot be tested scientifically.”163   
Judge Kravitz did not identify or describe these methodologies, other 
than identifying the sources presumably underlying Kohlmann’s 
opinions, and noting that Kohlmann had “acquired a considerable 
amount of information and documentation on these subjects.”164   
In assessing the reliability of his methods, Judge Kravitz described the 
positive peer review of Kohlmann’s work but did not mention any 
specifics.165  Judge Kravitz also quoted the opinion of the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York in United States v. 
Paracha,166 in which Judge Stein noted that Kohlmann’s work was 
accepted within the relevant community and that it was employed by 
experts permitted to testify in other such cases.167  Relying on Judge 
Stein’s opinion regarding Kohlmann’s methodology, Judge Kravitz 
found Kohlmann’s methodology reliable.168 
Recently, in United States v. Kassir,169 the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York again admitted Kohlmann to testify 
about the origins, history, structure, leadership, and operational 
methods of al-Qaida.170  The government charged Kassir with, among 
other charges,171 establishing and operating terrorist websites to 
                                                          
sources, including a variety of original and secondary sources, cross-checking sources 
against each other, and subjecting his conclusion to peer review . . . .” (citing United 
States v. Paracha, No. 03 CR. 1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768, at *20–21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 
2006), aff’d, 313 F. App’x 347 (2d Cir. 2008))). 
 163. United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 553 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125–26 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. at 126 (noting further that Kohlmann’s work “receives a considerable 
amount of peer review from academic scholars and others, and . . . is well 
regarded”). 
 166. No. 03 CR. 1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006), aff’d, 313  
F. App’x 347 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 167. Abu-Jihaad, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (quoting Paracha, 2006 WL 12768, at *20).  
In Paracha, Judge Stein cited United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004), 
for the notion that “[w]hatever the general pitfalls of the ‘vetting process’ that is 
employed by Kohlmann and others in his field, it is a sufficiently reliable 
methodology to meet the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 702.”  Paracha, 2006 WL 
12768, at *20 (citing Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 337). 
 168. See Abu-Jihaad, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (finding, “in its role as gatekeeper,” that 
“Mr. Kohlmann’s expected testimony me[t] the requirements of Rule 702”). 
 169. No. S2 04 Cr. 356(JFK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28837 (S.D.N.Y.  Apr. 2, 2009). 
 170. See id. at *1 (denying Kassir’s motion to exclude Kohlmann’s testimony). 
 171. See id. at *2 (noting that Kassir was also charged with establishing a jihad 
training camp in Bly, Oregon). 
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provide material support to terrorists and al-Qaida.172  At trial, the 
government sought to prove that Kassir operated the websites 
through an organization known as the Islamic Media Center.173   
Kohlmann’s thirty-page expert report174 follows the same pattern as 
that described above.  He begins with a twenty-page description of  
al-Qaida’s evolution, its leadership (with a focus on Osama Bin 
Laden), and its tradecraft.175  Kohlmann then describes the Islamic 
Media Center as follows: 
The “Islamic Media Center” (IMC) is a “second tier” jihadi online 
support group, dedicated to republishing terrorist propaganda and 
glorifying the cause of the mujahideen . . . . Over the length of its 
existence, the IMC has perhaps become most infamous for 
distributing a massive, highly detailed archive of Arabic-language 
terrorist training manuals over the Internet . . . . The manuals . . . 
cover an extremely expansive array of topics—everything from 
plastic explosives, to sniper tactics, chemical weapons, remote 
detonators, urban warfare techniques, and car bombs.176 
Kohlmann goes on to quote several passages from the “Poisons 
Handbook,” and he describes how the IMC “distributed a series of 
video recordings of sermons given by extreme Salafi clerics known for 
their support of Al-Qaida.”177  He begins his report by describing his 
qualifications and by quoting the courts’ admissibility decisions in 
Paracha and Abu-Jihaad.178 
In admitting Kohlmann, Judge Keenan relied heavily on the 
rulings from prior Daubert hearings in Paracha and Abu-Jihaad.  In his 
opinion, Judge Keenan noted that in Paracha, the court “found that 
Kohlmann’s reliance in part on secondary sources of information was 
permissible because other experts in his field reasonably relied on 
them.”179  Judge Keenan quoted extensively from Paracha, noting that 
                                                          
 172. See id. at *3 (noting that the government charged Kassir with “using the 
websites in a conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, and injure persons in a foreign 
country,” and to “distribute information relating to explosives, destructive devices, 
and weapons of mass destruction”). 
 173. Id. at *4. 
 174. EVAN F. KOHLMANN, EXPERT REPORT I:  U.S. V. OUSSAMA KASSIR (2009), http:// 
www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefakassirekexpert.pdf. 
 175. See id. at 2–20. 
 176. Id. at 20–21. 
 177. Id. at 24. 
 178. See id. at 2. 
 179. United States v. Kassir, S2 04 Cr. 356 (JFK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28837, at 
*18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009), new trial denied, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83075 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 11, 2009). 
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other courts had adopted that court’s reasoning.180  The court 
concluded that “Kohlmann’s expertise and reliability have not 
diminished, and the standard under Rule 702 and Daubert remains 
the same.”181 
Paracha, the case relied on by the trial courts in Abu-Jihaad and 
Kassir, illustrates the courts’ typical review of Kohlmann’s 
methodology.  Several courts182 have relied on Judge Stein’s analysis 
in Paracha to support their admissibility decisions. 
In Paracha, the government prosecuted Uzair Paracha for his role 
in providing material support to al-Qaida.183  Specifically, the 
government alleged that Paracha came to the United States and 
posed as someone he knew was associated with al-Qaida.184  To 
establish its case, the government proffered Kohlmann to testify 
regarding:  “the origins and structure of al Qaeda, its leaders, and its 
use of cells and individuals to provide logistical support”; “the roles of 
other alleged al Qaeda members or associates mentioned by Paracha 
in his statements to law enforcement officials”; and “al Qaeda 
counter-interrogation techniques.”185 
At the Daubert hearing, Kohlmann described his methodology as 
“gathering multiple sources of information, including original and 
secondary sources, cross-checking . . . new information against 
existing information and evaluating new information to determine 
whether his conclusions remain consonant with the most reliable 
sources.”186  Defendant Paracha challenged this methodology as  
                                                          
 180. See id. at *19 (citing United States v. Paracha, 313 F. App’x 347 (2d Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1582 (2009); United States v. Aref, 285 F. App’x 784  
(2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 553 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Conn. 2008); 
United States v. Sabir, No. S4 05 Cr. 673 (LAP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34372 
(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2007)). 
 181. Id.  Judge Keenan did reserve judgment on whether to admit Kohlmann as 
an expert in Forensic Computer Testimony.  Specifically, Kohlmann sought to testify 
about the link between the IMC and various email websites purportedly operated by 
the defendant, and Judge Keenan scheduled a Daubert hearing for that issue.  Id. at 
*20. 
 182. Courts in both Kassir and Abu-Jihaad relied on Judge Stein’s opinion, as did 
the court in United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 183. See United States v. Paracha, No. 03 CR. 1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768, at *6–7 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006) (noting that Paracha was charged in a five count indictment, 
including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and regulations issued under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b)), aff’d, 313  
F. App’x 347 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 184. See id.  Paracha allegedly obtained immigration documents that would permit 
him to enter the United States, and he accepted up to $200,000 of al-Qaida funds 
that he would invest in the business in which he was employed until al-Qaida needed 
the funds.  Id. 
 185. Id. at *18, *19. 
 186. Id. at *20. 
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“a mere culling from a handful of cases and internet reports 
information that the user deems reliable.”187  But Judge Stein 
disagreed, stating that “[w]hatever the pitfalls of this vetting process, 
and obviously it is not the same peer review as in a formal academic 
setting, it is . . . sufficiently reliable.”188 
The court found Kohlmann’s methodology “more reliable than a 
simple cherry-picking of information from websites and other 
sources.”189  According to the court, the hearing demonstrated that 
Kohlmann’s opinions and conclusions were subjected to various 
forms of peer review, and that his opinions were generally accepted 
within the relevant community.190  Judge Stein noted that the facts 
and sources underlying Kohlmann’s testimony, “although they do 
include secondary sources,” were similar to those used by experts in 
the particular field.191 
After a full-day hearing on Paracha’s motion in limine to preclude 
Kohlmann from testifying, the court admitted him as an expert but 
limited the scope of his testimony to:  describing the origins and 
organization of al-Qaida, identifying its leaders, and explaining its 
tradecraft.192  The court allowed him to testify on the origin, structure, 
                                                          
 187. Id. 
 188. Transcript of Hearing (Nov. 3, 2005) at 10, Paracha, 2006 WL 12768 
[hereinafter Transcript]. 
 189. Paracha, 2006 WL 12768, at *20. 
 190. In the transcript, Judge Stein does not mention the “academics and peers in 
the field” who reviewed Kohlmann’s work; he only notes that “[Kohlmann] 
explained the process by which his written publications are submitted for comment 
and critique by academics and peers in his field before publication, and how his 
postings on the internet, and presentations of public forums, are subject to review by 
his peers.”  Transcript, supra note 188, at 10. 
 191. Id. at 9.  The court described Kohlmann’s sources as “the 9/11 Commission 
report, confessions of al Qaeda members, information made available on the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, and original sources from terrorist groups.”  Id. at 10.  
Judge Stein described Kohlmann’s methods as similar to those used by a terrorism 
expert in two prior cases:  United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2005), 
and United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 337 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded 
on other grounds by 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), reinstated in relevant part by 405 F.3d 1034 
(4th Cir. 2005).  Id.  Matthew Levitt testified as an expert witness in both Damrah and 
Hammoud.  See infra Part II.D (likening Levitt to a “fox” as opposed to a “hedgehog”). 
 192. Transcript, supra note 188, at 12.  Judge Stein prohibited Kohlmann from 
testifying about the two alleged al-Qaida operatives involved in the particular case, 
finding that his proposed testimony was “too close to a summary of factual evidence 
from sources that the government cannot introduce directly.”  Id. at 12–13.   
The court also prohibited any testimony from Kohlmann on any specific terrorist 
plots—e.g., 9/11 and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing—because the probative 
value would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  There 
were no allegations in the case that the defendant had any connection to those plots.  
See id.  Judge Stein did allow Kohlmann to refer to terrorist plots generically “without 
specifying individual plots and attacks.”  Id.  As Judge Stein clarified:  “[Kohlmann] 
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and leadership of al-Qaida, analogizing the need for expert testimony 
in this area to that needed for cases involving organized crime 
families (in which courts have permitted testimony about the 
organization and operation of organized crime families).193  The 
court excluded his testimony regarding the roles of alleged co-
conspirators and regarding al-Qaida’s use of counter-interrogation 
techniques because such testimony would intrude on the jury’s 
function by summarizing factual evidence.194 
One court initially disallowed Kohlmann’s testimony but then 
admitted it at the time of trial.  Initially, in United States v. Amawi 
(Amawi I),195 Judge Carr granted the defendants’ motion in limine to 
exclude certain computer evidence obtained from them, not because 
the court found Kohlmann’s testimony unreliable, but because the 
court found that the testimony’s probative value was outweighed by 
“the risk of very unfair prejudice.”196 
In that case, the government charged the defendants with 
conspiring to kill and maim U.S. military forces in Iraq and with 
providing material support to terrorist organizations.197  The 
government sought to admit Kohlmann to testify about a series of his 
reports.198  The government offered two reports concerning “jihadist” 
                                                          
cannot talk about a plot to hijack 12 airlines or a plot to bomb embassies or a plot to 
bomb the USS Cole.  He can talk about terrorist attacks in general.”  Id. at 13. 
 193. The court cited two mob cases, United States v. Gotti, No. S8 02 CR 743 (RCC), 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21775 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004), and United States v. 
Lombardozzi, No. S1 02 CR. 273 (PKL), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6562 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 
2003), as support for its decision to admit Kohlmann.  Yet, in both Gotti and 
Lombardozzi, the expert’s knowledge (the same expert testified in both cases) was 
experiential; he was a criminal investigator with the United States Attorney’s Office 
testifying based on his thirty-five years of experience investigating organized crime in 
the area.  Gotti, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21775, at *3; Lombardozzi, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6562, at *5.  Also, neither judge in the mob cases even mentioned the 
reliability of the expert’s methodology; the courts’ gatekeeping dealt only with 
relevance—whether the testimony would assist the factfinder.  Gotti, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21775, at *14–15; Lombardozzi, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6562, at *13–14.  
Therefore, the court’s analogy in Paracha is not particularly helpful with regard to 
the reliability of Kohlmann’s methodology. 
 194. See Paracha, 2006 WL 12768, at *31 (noting further that the government 
cannot present testimony aimed at guiding the jury’s determination of the credibility 
of fact witnesses). 
 195. 541 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 196. Id. at 951. 
 197. Id. at 947.  Additional allegations were that “two defendants unlawfully 
distributed a video showing how to make a suicide bomb vest.”  Id. 
 198. See id. at 948.  The government offered five of Kohlmann’s reports:   
two reports discussed video, audio, and written materials seized from the defendants; 
a third report discussed a document called “39 Ways to Serve and Participate in 
Jihad”; a fourth report discussed five photographs of Amawi; and a fifth report 
discussed twenty-two training manuals found in Amawi’s possession.  Id. 
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materials, including “videos of acts of violence against members of 
the American armed forces in Iraq.”199  In addition, the government 
sought to have Kohlmann testify about the terrorist organizations’ 
use of the Internet as a tool for recruiting and training terrorists, and 
general information regarding international terrorism.200 
Judge Carr identified Kohlmann’s principal occupation as 
“collection of information—primarily from public sources on the 
internet—relating to terrorist organizations and activities.”201  He 
found that Kohlmann was qualified to testify about the topics 
described above “on the basis of his research, study, and analysis.”202  
The court nonetheless excluded his testimony on the grounds that 
the material, even if probative, was highly prejudicial.203  Judge Carr 
found certain aspects of Kohlmann’s proposed testimony irrelevant:  
“Bombs exploding, people being killed, and exhortations to violent 
jihad speak for themselves, as do the other materials in the 
government’s presentation.”204  Ultimately, the court excluded 
Kohlmann’s proposed testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 
401 and 402.205  The court explained that “[f]ew terms have a greater 
inherent risk of prejudgment than terrorism, terrorist, jihad, and  
Al-Quaeda [sic].”206  The court in Amawi I did not address the 
reliability of Kohlmann’s methodology. 
Despite his initial ruling, in a later ruling, Judge Carr allowed 
Kohlmann to testify, but apparently limited the scope of the 
testimony.207  Judge Carr noted that the parties were formulating 
                                                          
 199. Id. (noting that the “jihadist” materials either came from the government’s 
cooperating witness or were found during post-indictment searches of the 
defendants’ computers and residences). 
 200. Id. at 952. 
 201. Id. at 947. 
 202. See id. at 949 (identifying specific areas in which Kohlmann is qualified to 
testify, including such areas as “who has created and creates such materials, how they 
use the internet to disseminate them[,] . . . the apparent purposes in creating and 
distributing them and how internet users may be able to locate and access such 
materials”). 
 203. See id. at 954 (stating that “little . . . could come from Kohlmann’s testimony 
about the actual or relative comprehensiveness and size of the defendants’ 
downloaded collection”). 
 204. Id. at 950. 
 205. See id. (finding that Kohlmann’s testimony regarding “the source, nature, and 
utility of the [computer] materials [was] not relevant”). 
 206. Id. at 951.  The court also found the government’s reliance on organized 
crime cases to be unpersuasive and inapplicable.  Judge Carr noted the significant 
difference:  “In such cases, the government is attempting to show the defendant’s 
connection with and role in the group.  That’s not so here, where there is no basis 
for connecting any of the defendants with a particular group.”  Id. at 952. 
 207. See United States v. Amawi (Amawi II), 552 F. Supp. 2d 669, 672 n.2 (N.D. 
Ohio 2008), new trial denied, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80988 (N.D. Ohio May 15, 2009). 
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definitions of various organizations and events relating to the case 
that would be provided to the jury.208  He explained that the scope of 
permissible testimony by Kohlmann would depend on the parties’ 
success at formulating those definitions.209 
In a recent case out of an Atlanta district court, the trial court 
described Kohlmann’s methodology in greater detail than have other 
courts in previous decisions (and somewhat differently from how 
Kohlmann depicts his methodology in expert reports in other cases).  
Specifically, in United States v. Ahmed,210 Judge Duffey denied the 
defendants’ motion to exclude Kohlmann’s testimony, finding 
Kohlmann’s method of “comparative analysis”211 sufficiently reliable.  
According to Judge Duffey, Kohlmann divides sources into 
categories:  open (non-classified information from original sources, 
like interviews), secondary (“original video and audio recordings, 
books, magazines, and pamphlets written by specific individuals with 
knowledge of open source information”), and tertiary (newspaper 
and magazine articles “and other derivative publications”).212  Then, 
using his methodology of “comparative analysis,” Kohlmann 
“compar[es] and contrast[s] sources against one another to form a 
cohesive whole.”213 
One common thread in these admissibility decisions is that the 
courts routinely backtrack to prior admissibility decisions as a means 
of assessing Kohlmann’s reliability.  A second common thread is that 
none of the published opinions, with the exception of Judge 
Keenan’s decision in Kassir,214 demonstrate that the court has probed 
                                                          
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. 2009 WL 1370936 (N.D. Ga. June 1, 2009) (No. 1:06-cr-0147-WSD) (order 
denying a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Evan Kohlmann). 
 211. See id. at 21 (noting that Kolhmann gathers a variety of information, explains 
the different value of each piece, and synthesizes the information for his analysis). 
 212. Id. at 10. 
 213. Id. at 21.  Although I am not a social scientist, I spent some time researching 
whether social scientists use a comparative methodology that involves comparing and 
contrasting sources as the court indicated.  See id. at 22 (reasoning that the 
comparative method used by Kohlmann is “identical to those [methods] used by 
other experts in his field”).  I found that social scientists do indeed employ such a 
methodology.  In The Comparative Method, Charles C. Ragin depicts the method as 
one that involves comparing cases, such as historical events (the “case-oriented 
approach”).  CHARLES C. RAGIN, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD 34 (1987).  As Martha 
Howell and Walter Prevenier explain in their book, historians certainly do compare 
sources.  See MARTHA HOWELL & WALTER PREVENIER, FROM RELIABLE SOURCES:   
AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORICAL METHODS 69 (2001) (describing how historians use 
source comparison, as well as other methods, to determine the authenticity of 
sources and when to dismiss countervailing evidence). 
 214. See United States v. Kassir, No. S2 04 Cr. 356(JFK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28837, *19–21 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009) (considering whether Kohlmann’s expertise 
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into Kohlmann’s methodology to ensure that he strives to remain 
objective (by, for example, carefully and methodically deciding when 
to dismiss countervailing evidence).215  While Kohlmann’s 
methodology and conclusions may be sound in the sense that they 
reflect the same intellectual rigor as others in his field, the published 
Daubert opinions illustrate that courts accept his methodology and 
conclusions “hook, line, and sinker” without any real scrutiny.  This 
allows Kohlmann to rely primarily on Internet sources without ever 
having to explain to a court how he assesses the authenticity of those 
sources. 
C. Hedgehog Bias 
Kohlmann certainly presents himself like Berlin’s hedgehog—
appealing to the media, juries, and judges with his single-minded 
vision linking individuals to terrorism.216  Yet, his single-minded 
cognitive approach may certainly detract from his ability or 
willingness to recognize contrary evidence or to accept alternate 
explanations for an individual’s behavior.217  Accordingly, meaningful 
gatekeeping under Daubert becomes crucial to ensure that 
Kohlmann’s methodology is properly tested for reliability. 
Kohlmann potentially presents a type of bias that is different from 
the commonly discussed adversarial bias.218  The hedgehog’s bias does 
                                                          
includes Forensic Computer data collection), new trial denied, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
83075 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009). 
 215. I reviewed court transcripts and Kohlmann’s expert reports submitted for 
admissibility decisions.  None of them demonstrate that the courts asked tough 
questions, though the opinion in Ahmed, discussed above supra notes 210–213 and 
accompanying text, reflects that the court at least ascertained, in some detail, 
Kohlmann’s methods. 
 216. As courts continue to admit Kohlmann, with judges commending his 
methods and qualifications, some commentators paint a different picture.  
According to some, Kohlmann’s knowledge of terrorism is limited, but his 
propaganda and his ability to scare jurors about terrorists are bountiful.  See, e.g., 
CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES:  A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA 27 (Marie Breen Smyth, 
Jeroen Gunning, & Richard Jackson eds., 2009) (“Kohlmann skillfully mastered the 
‘art of court diving,’ volunteering to become an expert witness for the prosecution 
where he gains access to all discovery material, which in turn, through snowballing is 
reused in his analysis elsewhere.”); Mills, supra note 134 (describing Kohlmann’s 
methods as “scaremongering and blatant amateurism”). 
 217. This cognitive style does not have the same self-checking mechanisms as the 
fox’s style, which is known for its self-doubts and self-reflection.  See Gould, supra note 
5, at 5. 
 218. See David Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of 
the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 456 (2008) (describing different types of 
adversarial bias, including “selection bias,” which means that the expert “will 
represent the perspective the attorney wants to present at trial”).  Here, I am not 
referring to the ordinary biases that every person possesses, or even to “adversarial 
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not develop because one side has chosen and paid for the expert 
(thus motivating the expert to testify for that party);219 rather, the bias 
develops from the expert’s self-selection of the only side of the lawsuit 
on which she would ever testify.  I suspect that a hedgehog-type 
expert, like Kohlmann, would never switch sides and offer testimony 
on the background of terrorist organizations and recruiting methods 
for an alleged terrorist because his life’s work is tracking terrorists.220 
I use “hedgehog bias” to mean unfaltering devotion to that one, 
big, central idea that informs all of the hedgehog’s other ideas.  
Presumably, the hedgehog is so enamored with her one big idea that 
she instinctively dismisses all contrary, opposing points related to that 
idea.  The expert reshapes the data, sources, and facts to align with 
her one big idea.221  Thus, this bias impacts not only the expert’s 
conclusions, but also how she processes the evidence to reach the 
conclusion; it becomes part of her methodology.  This type of bias is 
presumably much more difficult for trial courts to discern (and even 
for a skillful cross-examiner to discern) than bias that impacts only an 
expert’s conclusions. 
This is not about an expert’s personality.222  Rather, this is about a 
cognitive approach that impacts an expert’s methods.223  Accordingly, 
what is currently accepted—that juries (and presumably judges) are 
drawn to charismatic personalities224—should be amended to include 
the idea that an expert’s single-minded cognitive approach may make 
the expert come across as more trustworthy because she has neatly 
                                                          
biases”; rather, I am referring to a bias that results from a longstanding devotion to a 
single idea that predates litigation.  Such bias informs all the expert’s related ideas. 
 219. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 
73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1013 (2008) (suggesting that a party selects a particular 
expert to testify because the party expects that the jury will find that expert most 
believable). 
 220. See Strauss, supra note 109 (implying that Kohlmann had a specific motive to 
pursue his research on terrorists after 9/11). 
 221. Here, I rely on the work of Professor Dan Simon and Professor Tobin 
Sparling for comparison.  As discussed in more detail below, Simon describes how, in 
the judge’s mind, “[t]he factual patterns, the authoritative texts, and the resulting 
propositions are restructured.”  Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision 
Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 20 (1998); see also Sparling, supra note 18. 
 222. Other commentators have written on experts being charismatic, and thus 
appealing to courts and juries.  See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence M. Solan, 
The Uneasy Relationship Between Science and Law:  An Essay and Introduction, 73 BROOK. 
L. REV. 847, 853 (2009). 
 223. In a sense, it becomes the expert’s methodology because it seems impossible 
to separate cognitive approach from methodology. 
 224. See Mnookin, supra note 219, at 1013 (noting that judges and juries tend to 
believe experts they find impressive, not necessarily because they understand the 
science). 
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aligned all the data in her mind, possibly discarding countervailing 
evidence. 
Courts probably like hedgehog-type experts for the same reasons 
that juries, the media, and lawyers do.225  She presents herself with 
confidence and charisma, and she explains her opinions with clarity 
and certainty.226  The hedgehog-type expert does not express self-
doubt or uncertainty; accordingly, judges favor her.  Commentators 
have described the irony of the legal system’s disdain for 
“uncertainty” with regard to scientific experts:  “The legal system is 
far more welcoming of dueling experts who reach opposite 
conclusions than it is of consensus without certainty.”227  Because of 
these attributes, the hedgehog-type expert actually fits much better 
within the typical model of judicial decision-making. 
In a sense, hedgehog bias resembles that which Professor Dan 
Simon describes as the judiciary’s “coherence bias.”228  Judges aspire 
to make decisions with certainty.  When a judge is confronted with a 
hard, complex case, the judge mentally “restructure[s]” the 
arguments so that the judge dismisses all the points related to the less 
favored position to arrive at a single, certain, favored position.229  
Professor Simon describes this shift toward closure as follows: 
                                                          
 225. See id.  This phenomenon is comparable to the outcome of the “Dr. Fox 
study,” in which an actor portrayed a preeminent scholar who gave a lecture entitled 
“Mathematical Game Theory as Applied to Physician Education” to a group of 
psychiatrists, educators, graduate students, and other professionals.  Deborah J. 
Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student Evaluations of Teaching, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 235, 
242 (2008).  Dr. Fox’s lecture was essentially nonsense, but the audience praised it 
because of Dr. Fox’s style, presentation, and analysis.  Id. 
 226. See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex 
Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 474 (1986) (relying on studies of cognitive styles in 
which judges tend to seek “right” or “wrong” answers, as opposed to scientists who 
“concentrate more on underlying concepts and gradations in correctness”). 
 227. Berger & Solan, supra note 222, at 852.  The legal system’s preference for 
experts who express their opinions with certainty also applies in the scientific arena.  
Id.  In their book about the legal system’s “idealization of science,” Professors Caudill 
and LaRue explain why judges, at times, mistakenly admit bad scientists and exclude 
good ones: 
Science is thus not characterized by its objectivity and certainty—and 
conclusions are seen as often tentative, contradictory, or probabilistic. . . . 
This does not signal unreliability, but rather marks the typical conditions 
under which natural and social scientists work to produce useful knowledge. 
. . . [T]he reason why those judges did not recognize the practical goals and 
limitations of science . . . was their idealized image of the features of the 
scientific enterprise. 
CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 14, at 23–24. 
 228. See Simon, supra note 221, at 21 (explaining that judicial reasoning is 
different from typical legal reasoning because, unlike lawyers, the judge has to make 
a final decision). 
 229. See Sparling, supra note 18. 
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 [T]he judge’s mental representation of the dispute evolves 
naturally towards a state of coherence.  That is, the cognitive system 
imposes coherence on the arguments so that the subset of arguments 
that supports one outcome becomes more appealing to the judge 
and the opposite subset, including arguments that previously 
seemed appropriate, turns less favorable.230 
Simon illustrates in his research how the coherence model actually 
results in decisions based on skewed mental models:  “Due to these 
coherence shifts, at the culmination of the process, the decision-maker’s 
mental model is skewed toward conformity with the emerging 
decision.  As the hard case morphs into an easy one, the decision 
follows easily and confidently.”231  Judge Richard Posner described 
judicial opinions as being “couched in a ‘vocabulary of apodictic 
certainty.’”232  Thus, the judicial decision-making process impels the 
judge toward certainty, which the hedgehog-type expert provides. 
D. Matthew Levitt—A Likely Fox 
Though I chose to focus on the hedgehog-type expert because of 
its awkward interplay with Daubert gatekeeping, the fox-type cognitive 
approach also underscores flaws in Daubert.  At times, the government 
proffers two other experts to testify in criminal cases against alleged 
terrorists, though with much less frequency than the government 
proffers Kohlmann.233  One of these experts, Matthew Levitt, is a 
senior fellow and director of the Washington Institute’s Stein 
Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy.234  Based on only a 
limited review, Levitt seems more fox-like.  Levitt’s background is 
academic and varied, with a master’s degree in law and diplomacy 
and a doctorate from Tufts’ Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.235  
Levitt has worked for the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), where he focused on studying 
                                                          
 230. Simon, supra note 221, at 20. 
 231. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box:  Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision 
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 517 (2004). 
 232. Richard A. Posner, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 30 (1990). 
 233. The government has proffered expert witnesses Dr. Richard Tanter and 
Matthew Levitt in these cases.  See, e.g., United States v. Batiste, No. 06-20373-CR, 
2007 WL 5303052, at *1–6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2007) (offering Dr. Richard Tanter as 
the government’s expert witness to provide information regarding the stages of the 
“radicalization process”); United States v. Holy Land Found. For Relief and Dev.,  
No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL 2059722, at *7–10 (N.D. Tex. July 16, 2007) (offering 
Matthew Levitt as the government’s expert witness to teach the jury about Hamas). 
 234. See Expert Biography for Matthew Levitt, The Washington Institute for  
Near East Policy, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC10.php?CID=5 (last 
visited on Feb. 3, 2010). 
 235. Id. 
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fundraising and logistical support methods of terrorist groups in the 
Middle East.236  He has studied negotiation, and he lists terrorism and 
the Arab-Israeli peace process as areas of expertise.237 
During a roundtable discussion on counterterrorism assistance 
programs, Levitt began his remarks by stating, “I don’t claim to be an 
expert on the issue of capacity building or training assistance per  
say . . . .”238  In addition, many of his PolicyWatch/PeachWatch articles 
are titled as questions:  for example, “Gaza:  The Next Terrorist Safe 
Haven?”239 and “Iran Sanctions:  Can They Be Effective?”240  Thus, 
even with his language, Levitt presents himself as more open-minded 
and receptive to the possible merit of opposing views.  In one of the 
cases in which the government proffered Levitt, United States v. Holy 
Land Foundation for Relief and Development,241 the court excluded his 
testimony because the government had not established the reliability 
of Levitt’s methodology.242  Specifically, the defendants had 
“dissect[ed]” the authorities in Levitt’s book (on which he was going 
to rely) and attempted to demonstrate that Levitt’s methodology did 
not satisfy the intellectual rigor standard.243 
Although Levitt has strong qualifications in terms of social science 
methodology, presumably, when testifying, he would be prone to 
describing the ambiguities relating to his theories or conclusions.  
Perhaps he would treat testifying more like classroom teaching, 
where professors probe the uncertainties, thus making him less 
attractive to courts and juries.  In a sense, how courts treat experts 
with more fox-like characteristics may be similar to what Caudill and 
LaRue describe as courts’ “idealization” of scientific testimony—the 
expectation that good science will always yield results with a high 
                                                          
 236. Id. 
 237. Id.; see also MATTHEW LEVITT, NEGOTIATING UNDER FIRE:  PRESERVING PEACE 
TALKS IN THE FACE OF TERROR ATTACKS (2008). 
 238. Transcript of Remarks of Matthew Levitt, Reforming U.S. Counterterrorism 
Assistance Programs, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template= 
C07&CID=452 (last visited Feb. 3, 2010). 
 239. See Matthew Levitt, Gaza:  The Next Terrorist Safe Haven?, POLICYWATCH/ 
PEACEWATCH, June 29, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php? 
CID=2631. 
 240. See Matthew Levitt, Iran Sanctions:  Can They Be Effective?, POLICYWATCH/ 
PEACEWATCH, Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php? 
CID=2673. 
 241. No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL 2059722 (N.D. Tex. July 16, 2007). 
 242. See id. at *8–9 (explaining that the court was not completely convinced by the 
defense’s challenges to Levitt, but holding that the government had to provide more 
than “unsubstantiated and unverified assertion[s]” to prove reliability). 
 243. See id. at *8 (noting that the defendants used the declaration of Professor 
Charles D. Smith to depict the shortcomings in Levitt’s methodology). 
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degree of certainty.244  Ultimately, regardless of whether an expert is 
more fox- or hedgehog-like, the gatekeeping system needs to be 
rejuvenated to account for the differences in how experts process 
information. 
III. PROPOSAL:  REJUVENATE DAUBERT TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF 
AN EXPERT’S COGNITIVE APPROACH 
The goal of Daubert gatekeeping is clear: 
It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon 
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the 
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the 
practice of an expert in the relevant field.245 
Thus, in assessing an expert’s methodology, the court should 
consider an expert’s intellectual approach—not only what an expert 
thinks, but how an expert thinks.  This would require courts to shift 
some longstanding presumptions.  For instance, on remand in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert II),246 Judge 
Kozinski stated that when an expert testifies based on research he 
conducted before litigation, this “provides important, objective proof 
that the research comports with the dictates of good science.”247  
However, as shown herein, a lifetime of research in a particular area 
may also signify a tendency toward devotion to an idea that taints the 
expert’s analysis. 
I do not recommend a major overhaul of Daubert but rather a 
revitalization of the test to include certain presumptions (and to 
eliminate certain previously held assumptions) and thereby ensure 
that courts scrutinize methodology. 
A revised and rejuvenated gatekeeping scheme would assist courts 
in recognizing experts with hedgehog-type approaches, if, for 
instance, the expert satisfies these criteria:  (1) the expert always 
testifies for the same side (or party) to a lawsuit in the same type of 
lawsuit; (2) the expert has worked (outside of testifying) for the entity 
on behalf of which she is testifying; (3) the expert has provided 
expertise on the subject outside of court (e.g., in the media); (4) the 
expert has spent considerable time studying/exploring the set of 
ideas prior to litigation; and (5) the expert leaves no room for doubt 
                                                          
 244. CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 14. 
 245. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). 
 246. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 247. Id. at 1317.  Judge Kozinski went on to say that “experts whose findings flow 
from existing research are less likely to have been biased toward a particular 
conclusion by the promise of remuneration.”  Id. 
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(she expresses her opinions with an unfaltering sense of certainty).  
This would turn the presumptions currently underlying Daubert 
gatekeeping upside-down, as characteristics that previously supported 
reliability of methodology would now be considered reasons to 
closely scrutinize the expert’s methods. 
If the expert meets these criteria, the court should investigate the 
expert’s methodology to determine whether the expert is capable of 
being even-handed with the evidence.  For example, as a trial judge,  
I would ask the following “tough” questions of an expert like 
Kohlmann: 
1. What, very specifically, is Kohlmann’s peer community?  Is it  
(a) those who track al-Qaida and its connection to Azzam 
Publications on the Internet, (b) political scientists who study 
international affairs and who specialize in terrorist organizations, 
or (c) those who use Internet sources to track any type of 
organization because the expertise actually involves the proper 
collection of Internet sources? 
 
2. Has Kohlmann published in “academic” journals alongside 
political scientists who study international affairs, and what is the 
reputation among peers of the blogs on which he frequently posts? 
 
3. Should the court’s inquiry probe into Kohlmann’s use of 
Internet sources and his expertise in deciding the authenticity of 
these sources, what methods does Kohlmann use to authenticate 
his Internet sources?248  And the follow-up question:  What does the 
community of “Internet researchers”—those who study and teach 
how to authenticate Internet sources—think of his methods? 
 
4. How does Kohlmann prioritize Internet sources in terms of 
authenticity? 
 
5. How does Kohlmann handle contrary evidence, for example, 
evidence supporting the notion that Azzam Publications has other 
primary functions, aside from recruiting terrorists, and that a 
particular defendant has been engaged in this other function? 
 
6. How have terrorist groups’ use of the Internet changed since 
9/11, and how has Kohlmann reacted to this change? 
                                                          
 248. This suggests an entirely different type of expertise—an Internet source 
expert rather than simply an expert on terrorist organizations. 
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Presently, courts do not ask these questions. 
This proposal requires more than courts acknowledging 
differences among types of potential experts and using those 
differences to determine the proper gatekeeping test and degree of 
scrutiny.  Courts presently distinguish between scientific and 
nonscientific experts and then, within nonscientific expertise, courts 
differentiate technical and experiential experts from academic 
experts (notably, Kohlmann is not any of the above; he is self-made 
based on studying a particular subject).249  Courts should 
acknowledge these differences because they relate to peer 
community.  The cognitive style of the expert—whether scientific or 
nonscientific—is a more telling indicator of reliability of 
methodology (and a reason to apply stricter or softer scrutiny) than is 
the type of expert.  
If investigating different methodologies is overly cumbersome, 
special masters could be appointed to research and advise courts on 
how to assess the methodology of a particular type of expert.  
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, a judge may appoint 
a special master to recommend findings of fact in certain 
circumstances.250  The master could check the expert’s description of 
methodology to see whether it matches the “intellectual rigor” 
expected in the field.  Courts could obtain these masters from 
professional organizations or academic institutions.  Although it 
would increase court costs (in terms of paying the master),251 it would 
shorten the Daubert hearing and lessen the time the judge must take 
                                                          
 249. See Victoria E. Brieant & William N. Hebert, Soft Science and the Courts After 
Daubert:  Non-Scientific Expert Testimony, SF78 ALI-ABA 111 (2001) (discussing how 
soft-science experts are evaluated under Daubert, listing nonscientific or technical 
disciplines as:  “medical/mental health, engineering, accident reconstruction, police 
procedures, fire/arson, economics, accounting, patents and trademarks, law, 
appraisal, insurance, and securities”).  The article did not include such disciplines as 
political science, linguistics, or history.  Id. 
 250. Rule 53(a)(1)(B)(i) permits judges to appoint a master to recommend 
findings of fact on issues for the court to decide if “warranted by . . . some 
exceptional condition.”  The rule also provides for the appointment of a master to 
perform an accounting or to “resolve a difficult computation of damages.”  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(B)(ii).  In Joiner, Justice Breyer suggested the use of special masters 
to assist courts in understanding specialized knowledge pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 706.  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 251. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(h). 
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to research the methodology.252  Accordingly, the overall process 
would make the hearing more efficient and effective. 
Thus, a rejuvenated Daubert test would involve a different set of 
presumptions from those that currently exist.  Primarily, judges 
would focus on methodology, keeping that assessment separate from 
qualifications.  A judge would not assume that because an expert is 
wholeheartedly devoted to a set of ideas, the judge should be equally 
smitten by those ideas.  Comparatively, though not the subject of this 
Article, the fox-type expert should not provoke typical presumptive 
responses from trial courts.  Because the fox-like expert expresses a 
lack of certainty and even some self-doubt, the court should not infer 
that the expert’s methodology is untrustworthy.253 
A. Courts Should Determine and Apply the Most Fitting Set of Factors, 
Given the Type of Expertise 
Until the use of special masters takes hold, courts can themselves 
determine and apply factors that fit the type of expertise.  Judge 
Irenas of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey 
attempted this in Milanowicz v. Raymond Corp.,254 a products liability 
action involving injuries caused by a forklift.255  Judge Irenas crafted a 
particular gatekeeping test for the plaintiff’s engineering expert—a 
“reconfigured” Daubert analysis fitting for an engineer.256  Judge Irenas 
included the following factors in his test:  (1) federal design and 
performance standards; (2) independent standards organizations;  
(3) relevant literature; (4) industry practice; (5) product design and 
accident history; (6) charts and diagrams; (7) scientific testing;  
(8) feasibility of suggested modifications, and (9) risk-utility of 
suggested modification.257  Using these factors, Judge Irenas held that 
the testimony of the expert lacked reliability, as the expert, for 
                                                          
 252. See Margaret G. Farrell, Special Masters in the Federal Courts Under Revised Rule 
53:  Designer Roles, SM051 ALI-ABA 1 (2007) (suggesting that the use of a special 
master in a Daubert hearing would provide a decision-maker who knew the area of 
science and would save time and money). 
 253. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 14. 
 254. 148 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 255. See id. at 540 (holding that an expert witness’s testimony was inadmissible 
because the engineer consultant lacked “indicia of reliability”). 
 256. Id. at 532. 
 257. Id. at 533–36.  Judge Irenas “culled” the factors from a nationwide search of 
cases, mostly involving products liability.  Id. at 532. 
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example, “identified nothing in the literature which would suggest 
peer review of his conclusions.”258 
Some commentators opine that no matter what test is applied, the 
effectiveness of Daubert may not change.  Edward Cheng argues for 
independent judicial research because of flaws in Daubert 
gatekeeping.259  Specifically, he argues that, regardless of the factors 
of the test, judges will continue to apply “some general level of 
scrutiny to scientific evidence,” which often misapplies the Daubert 
factors.260  As Cheng’s article suggests, the degree of scrutiny and 
proper application of the test is as important as the particular factors 
of the test.261  But given a fitting set of factors and an appropriate 
degree of rigor, the court could simply test the logic of an expert’s 
testimony against the expert’s stated methodology.  As one 
commentator aptly noted, courts should be able to judge the 
reliability of methodology and conclusions if such methodology is 
described well: 
 [T]he judiciary’s expertise is in deconstructing an argument:  
assessing the logic of the argument, the validity of its premises, the 
rigor with which the witness applied the technique, the faithfulness 
of the witness’s application of the methodology to her description 
of it, the magnitude of the inference drawn by the witness in 
forming her opinion, and the sufficiency of the facts to support the 
inference.262 
The court should, with a proper set of factors, be able to 
distinguish the expert whose big idea is not supported by a reliable 
                                                          
 258. Id. at 538.  Judge Irenas’s attempt to craft a suitable standard for the 
engineering expert’s methodology, rather than simply rubber-stamping or excluding 
the expert because of her atypical expertise, is commendable. 
 259. Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 
1263, 1268 (2007) (arguing that such research should be required when judges face 
new and difficult scientific issues). 
 260. Cheng illustrates the courts’ “patent distortion and misunderstanding” of 
certain Daubert factors through his discussion of United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 
(7th Cir. 2001), in which the Seventh Circuit approved the lower court’s admission 
of a fingerprinting expert because the techniques had been tested in an adversarial 
setting and each result is verified by peer review, and United States v. Llera Plaza,  
No. CR. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 27305, at *10–11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), in which the 
court rejected Havvard’s inaccurate description of fingerprinting.  Cheng, supra note 
259, at 1270. 
 261. Cheng, supra note 259, at 1268. 
 262. See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, supra note 29, at 2148 (distilling the 
court’s gatekeeping role from several cases).  Trial courts describe their quest as 
ensuring the logic of the step from evidence to conclusion.  See, e.g., Franklin v. Sheet 
Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, No. 06-0004-CV-W-GAF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74742, at 
*16 (W.D. Mo. 2008) (excluding an expert because of his failure to provide “a logical 
course of evidence to support his speculative conclusion”). 
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methodology from the expert who used a methodology similar to that 
used by her peers outside of litigation. 
Ultimately, courts should develop a suitable set of factors to test a 
particular social science methodology.  Courts should rely on 
available resources like professional organizations to assist in 
developing a standard.263  As described by Judge Brown, the standard 
for reliability falls into three categories:  methodological, 
foundational, and connective.264  For each of these categories,  
I present factors courts should use to assess trustworthiness; I also 
present three factors (referred to as “bias indicators”) specifically 
aimed at highlighting an expert’s potential bias. 
1. Methodological 
a. Response of peer review community 
First, the court should identify the expert’s peer community.   
The court can then assess whether the methodology and ultimate 
conclusion or theory has been peer reviewed (and the result of such 
review).  The expert should provide both criticism and praise—any 
commentary on the expert’s methodology should be offered.  If the 
peer review is written, the court should also consider how the journal 
is used and how it is regarded in the peer community.  Obviously, the 
peer community should be the same one in which the expert works 
outside of litigation. 
b. Dispassionate allegiance to professional standards 
In the social science community, certain fields have professional 
organizations with standards.  The American Political Science 
Association, for example, may be able to provide standards for a 
particular analysis.  Courts should review these standards in deciding 
whether the expert followed the proper methodology. 
2. Foundational reliability 
a. Method of selecting/verifying supporting evidence and documents 
This factor has two aspects:  how the expert selects which sources to 
rely on, and how the expert verifies the authenticity of those sources.  
                                                          
 263. For example, the American Political Science Association provides many 
resources and conferences, including resources on methodology.  American Political 
Science Association Home Page, http://www.apsanet.org (last visited Feb. 3, 2010). 
 264. See Brown, supra note 51, at 749. 
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This becomes particularly important when the expert’s sources come 
largely from the Internet. 
b. Treatment of contrary evidence or methodology 
Because so much of social science (political science, history,265 and 
anthropology) is based on document selection and interpretation, 
courts should focus on this factor in assessing a social science expert’s 
methodology.266  Experts should be required to describe and identify 
sources contrary to their opinions and explain why they rejected 
those sources.  This factor takes on even greater importance when 
the expert displays hedgehog-type characteristics. 
c.  Whether the field of expertise is “known to reach reliable results” for 
the type of opinion the expert offers in court 267 
This factor sounds like the categorical review described above.  
This Article does not directly address the merits of this type of review; 
however, I certainly reject the notion that a court should admit an 
expert in one case because another judge in a different case held that 
her testimony was admissible.  I also reject the notion that courts 
should assess the reliability of a type of expertise (e.g., fingerprinting 
analysis) and that such action fulfills their gatekeeping obligation. 
                                                          
 265. In her note concerning the libel case brought by David Irving against 
Professor Deborah Lipstadt, Wendie Schneider extracts from the judge’s opinion a 
standard for historian expert-testimony.  Wendie Ellen Schneider, Note, Past 
Imperfect, 110 YALE L.J. 1531, 1535 (2001).  Many of these factors are useful for social 
science testimony generally.  Schneider extracts the following rules from Judge 
Gray’s opinion:  (1) ”treat sources with appropriate reservations;” (2) refrain from 
dismissing countervailing evidence without proper consideration; (3) be even-
handed and avoid “cherry-picking” the evidence; (4) indicate when speculating;  
(5) refrain from “mistranslat[ing]” or “omitting” sections of documents; (6) “weigh 
the authenticity of all accounts, not merely those that contradict her favored view;” 
and (7) consider the “motives of historical actors.” Id. (citing Irving v. Penguin Books 
Ltd., 2000 WL 362478 (Q.B. Div. Apr. 11, 2000)).  For each rule, Schneider cites 
parts of Judge Gray’s opinion in which he criticizes Irving for his one-sided approach 
to his historical scholarship.  Id. at 1535 nn.22–28.  She describes the benefits of this 
standard as follows: 
It would discourage dismissal of evidence based simply on the historian’s 
holding convictions about his or her subject matter; it would give judges a 
more nuanced understanding of what historians should and should not be 
expected to testify to on the stand; and it would combat the tendency of 
historians on either side of a case to present unduly one-sided conclusions. 
Id. at 1540. 
 266. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes (providing a similar, though 
different, test:  “Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative 
explanations”).  
 267. See J & V Dev., Inc. v. Athens-Clarke County, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1226 
(M.D. Ga. 2005) (providing an example for the application of this factor). 
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3. Connective 
a. Ipse dixit 
The court should assess whether the expert has unjustifiably 
extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded 
conclusion—the ipse dixit problem of General Electric Co. v. Joiner.268  
The court can simply decide whether the conclusion makes sense, 
given the methodological steps. 
4. Bias indicators 
a. Context in which expert developed methodology/theory 
Under this factor, the court should assess whether the theory, 
interpretation, or methodology has been employed in a non-trial 
(academic, for example) setting.269  Again this factor may now cut the 
other way (suggesting a need to further scrutinize the methodology) 
if the expert has made her life’s work of pursuing the ideas about 
which she plans to testify. 
b. Overcoming bias 
If the expert’s characteristics suggest a hedgehog-like devotion 
toward a particular idea, the court should determine what steps the 
expert has taken to ensure that the devotion did not skew her 
methodology or conclusions. 
c. Subjective interpretation 
If the theory clearly calls for a subjective interpretation (e.g., of the 
meaning of a document), the court should acknowledge this and 
adequately scrutinize the expert’s methodology to ensure that she 
took steps to check (and double check) her objectivity in arriving at 
her conclusions.270 
                                                          
 268. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 269. On remand, the Ninth Circuit in Daubert added this factor to the list:  
whether the expert’s opinion was developed independent of the litigation or strictly 
for purposes of testifying.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 
1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995); see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 743 
(3d Cir. 1994) (suggesting that an expert’s testimony is only admissible if the 
research was conducted for purposes of the trial). 
 270. See Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1311. 
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B. At the Same Time, Courts Should Enforce Procedural Reforms to Ensure 
Accountability and Transparency 
In addition to the proposals described above, appellate courts 
should require greater accountability and transparency from trial 
courts.  In No Magic Wand, Professors Caudill and LaRue describe 
how appellate decision-making about scientific experts reflected a 
more realistic approach to science than did trial courts’ admissibility 
decisions.271  Thus, the appellate courts reversed decisions in which 
trial courts expected nothing less than certainty from scientific 
experts.272  This appellate review serves as a check on a trial court’s 
idealistic (and, according to the authors, unrealistic) view of science. 
This check requires trial courts to make detailed findings 
(transparency) concerning each aspect of expert admissibility 
(accountability).273  These findings would include a description of the 
various factors the court used to test reliability and the specific 
reasons for the court’s decision regarding reliability of methodology.  
Thus, the appellate standard would remain abuse of discretion,274 but 
the discretion would require adherence to certain requirements, like 
making the findings described herein. 
Finally, trial courts should also adhere to the proponent’s burden 
of establishing admissibility, rather than setting a very low threshold 
and then requiring the other side to establish the unreliability of the 
expert testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
Much has been written on the merits and shortcomings of Daubert 
and about experts and bias, particularly adversarial bias stemming 
from remunerating experts and the parties’ zeal to win.  Yet, little 
exists (either with regard to trial practice or in a more theoretical 
sense) about whether certain traits of experts tend to diminish the 
efficacy of Daubert.  In other words, perhaps we need to ponder not 
only what is wrong with Daubert as a gatekeeping test and what courts 
can do about it, but also how experts’ cognitive approaches impact 
courts’ ability to assess methodology under Daubert. 
                                                          
 271. CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 14, at 20–23. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, supra note 29, at 2150 (stating that 
judges can take reliability determinations from the jury as long as judicial rulings 
have “greater transparency and accountability”). 
 274. See Saks, supra note 104, at 234–35 (arguing that scientific rulings should 
receive de novo review). 
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Courts routinely admit Evan Kohlmann to testify as an expert 
witness in very high-profile criminal cases against alleged terrorists.  
Courts do so because Kohlmann presents himself as the “gold 
standard” for counterterrorism expertise.  During his career, 
Kohlmann has made it his life’s work to follow terrorist organizations 
and gather data.  In his reports, Kohlmann links whatever 
organization or website is at issue in the case (because of the 
defendant’s alleged ties to that entity) to al-Qaida, Osama Bin Laden, 
and terrorism generally; he does so with unfaltering conviction, 
powerful language and imagery, and no room for doubt.  As a result, 
courts, attracted to Kohlmann’s certainty, admit him to testify about 
these issues. 
The missing piece in this seemingly perfect equation is a real 
inquiry by courts into Kohlmann’s methodology.  In only one 
opinion does the court actually describe his methodology by name; 
otherwise, courts merely accept Kohlmann’s description of his 
method.  In accepting Kohlmann’s method, courts lean heavily on 
the fact that he has been engaged in this process since he was in law 
school and that other courts have accepted his methodology.  When 
viewed through the lens of the fox/hedgehog dichotomy, courts’ 
current gatekeeping of a hedgehog-type expert’s methodology is 
shown to have little substance and a great need for repair. 
